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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY  
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Ripping away colonial ties and bursting into an era of independence, freedom and 
development, African states welcomed the international movement for the development 
of a global human rights system in the 1950s and 60s. The pillars of this system ushered 
in rights that, it was hoped, would fully sever the stronghold of colonialism over African 
economies, cultures and governments.1 Accession, ratification, and translation of the 
instruments defining this system meant for millions of Africans the right to education, to 
vote, to self determination, to culture, and to development. Thus, with the terror and after 
effects of colonial subjugation, poverty, oppression and gross underdevelopment in the 
not so distant past, many African states signed on to the hope of their enablement to 
create non-discriminatory, fair, just, equitable and prosperous societies.2 Today, forty 
years into the creation of this hope, the continent is only thirteen years removed from the 
horror of the Rwandan genocide and the fall of the dehumanizing apartheid regime. 
Situations in Sudan, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Swaziland 
are but a few of the current crises that characterize and testify to the consistent singing of 
this hope in Africa. Conditions of humanity in Africa have continued to plummet as 
social and political unrest, conflicts and wars arise that are fuelled by the remnants of 
                                                 
1 See Lyon, B., “Discourse in Development: Viewing the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights Through the Post Colonial Lens” (2003) Paper 11, Villanova School of Law Working 
Paper Series; Ibhawoh, B., “Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of 
Human Rights in the African State” (2000), Vol. 22, Human Rights Quarterly, 842-843 and 846-847; 
Oloka-Onyango, J., “Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Economic and Social Rights in 
Africa”, (1995), Vol. 26 #1, University of Minnesota Human Rights Library and Makinda, S., “Democracy 
and Multi-Party Politics in Africa”(1996), Vol. 34 (4) Journal of Modern African Studies, 555-573. 
2 See Table 1, African State Parties to the ICESCR, Chapter 3, 2. 
Approximately 58 percent of African State Parties signed and or ratified the treaty within the first 15 yrs of 
its entry into force. 
*Denotes African State Parties accession to the Covenant between 1976 and 1991. 
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colonialism, desperation over scarce resources and highly coveted positions of unfettered, 
unchallenged power and leadership.3  
Despite that the overwhelming majority of African States are signatories4 to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights5, one of the three pillars 
of the International Bill of Human Rights6, basic rights, such as that to health, education 
and the continuous improvement of living conditions, are yet to fully take root and be 
realized in the majority of these countries.7 African leaders have cited a crisis of available 
resources as the major culprit of this8 while the international community has criticised 
African States as not being serious enough about the protection and promotion of ESCRs 
                                                 
3Don Najira, D.C. “The Protection of Human Rights: Meaning and Application in the African Context” in 
Symonides, J. Human Rights: International Protection, Monitoring, Enforcement (2002), 213-218, 
Shedrack, A.C., “Reclaiming Humanity: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as the Cornerstone of 
African Human Rights”, (2002) Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, 181-183; also see 
UNDP’s Indicators by Tables: Monitoring Human Development: Enlarging People’s Choices at 
http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/indicators/indicators_table.cfm for water, sanitation, nutrition status, 
life expectancy and human poverty indices. 
4 See Table 1. 
5 The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, GA Resolution 2200A (XXI) 16 
December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976 (hereinafter “the ICESCR” or “the Covenant”). 
6 The International Bill of Human Rights (hereinafter “IBHR”) is comprised of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 1948 
UN Doc. A/810; hereinafter “the UDHR”), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights GA Resolution 2200A (XXI) 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 26 March 1976; hereinafter “the ICCPR”)as well as the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 
GA Resolution 2200A (XXI) 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976; hereinafter “the 
ICESCR” or “The Covenant”). 
7 See UNDP’s Indicators by Tables: Monitoring Human Development: Enlarging People’s Choices at 
http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/indicators/indicators_table.cfm for water, sanitation, nutrition status, 
life expectancy and human poverty indices.  
8 Odinakulu, C.A., “Analysis of Paralysis or Paralysis by Analysis: Implementing Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights Under the African Charter of People’s and Human Rights”, (2001), vol. 23, Human Rights 
Quarterly, 327-369; Leopold Senghor’s (founder of Senegal) comment that “human rights begin with 
breakfast” “became the slogan of some developing country governments, who argued that a new international 
economic order was a prerequisite for the adequate realisation of human rights.” From: Plant, R. “Human 
rights, decent work and the role of labour  standards in international development policies a concept paper on 
rights-based thinking, as applied to the ilo's  standard-setting activities” at: 
http://training.itcilo.it/decentwork/staffconf2002/presentations/planthrlabour02.doc 
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and ignoring the obligations associated with their implementation and enforcement.9 
While there are valid and factual examples in support of both these positions, to 
understand which factor is the main constraint, it must be assessed whether the 
benchmarks set by the Covenant, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) and the international community to measure States’ progress towards 
the full realization of ESCRs are impacted by a crisis of available resources and or 
political will within the African socio-economic and political context. Though human 
rights over the last sixty years have gradually come to be regarded as universal, criticism 
of the very low levels of human development and the persistent non-realization of ESCRs 
in Africa make it is necessary to look at the effectiveness of the benchmarks and 
benchmarking processes set to measure States’ compliance with obligations towards the 
realization of ESCRs by examining whether they are significantly affected by a constraint 
in available resources or political will in African States.   
 
1.2 OBJECTIVE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY  
There is currently no literature which looks specifically at the relative roles of 
resources and political will in the functioning of the benchmarks set by the ICESCR for 
measuring State obligation function within the African context. Current literature on 
measuring positive State obligations and compliance with the Covenant suggests broadly 
that standards for measuring positive obligations and the implementation and realization 
                                                 
9 See Human Rights Watch, 2001 World Report: Africa at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/africa/index.html and 
Amnesty International: African Union Summit in Accra: Time for African leaders to make human rights 
Count and Implement Their Promises and Commitments at: 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIOR630032007 
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of ESCRs are not affected by States’ varying socio-economic and that they can be 
adequately undertaken in a variety of political contexts.10 In light of the assertion of the 
crisis of available resources in Africa and criticisms of the gross non-realization of 
ESCRs in Africa, this study will examine the extent to which resources constrain States 
in fully engaging with the benchmarking processes established by the Covenant, the 
CESCR and, ultimately, the full realization of ESCRs. It is envisaged that the result of 
this study will illuminate broader issues surrounding current benchmarks and 
benchmarking processes established by the ICESCR and the CESCR and, ultimately, the 
realization of ESCRs in Africa. 
 
1.3 METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The study commences in Chapter one with the background of ESCRs. This includes a 
historical background of the development of ESCRs and a sectional overview of the 
Covenant.  
Chapter Two begins by establishing constituents of effective benchmarking to 
provide a framework for analysing the benchmarks and benchmarking processes 
established by the committee and the Covenant. This entailed looking at the concept of 
“benchmarks” as is used in the human rights context and thence at the benchmarks 
expressed and benchmarking processes established by the Covenant as well as those 
developed in relevant discourse since its entry into force which further expound the 
nature and scope of legal obligations under the Covenant. Article 2(1) of the Covenant, 
                                                 
10 See Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, (1987), Vol. 9, Human Rights Quarterly, 124, para 6, and The Committee on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3, The Nature of State Parties Obligation (Art. 2.1 of the Covenant) 
UN Doc HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 45 (1994) 14 of December 1990, para 8.; hereinafter “General Comment No. 
3”. 
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the Limburg Principles11 and the Maastricht Guidelines12 as well as some of the General 
Comments of the CESCR were reviewed and critically analysed. Their strengths and 
weaknesses were assessed in order to establish the potential impact of the constraint of 
resources and political will as States engage with them.  
As the CESCR has indicated that the State reporting system is essential to 
national benchmarking13, chapter three of the study firsts looks at the general role of and 
issues associated with State reporting as a benchmarking process. This sets the stage for 
the discussion on State reporting and national benchmarking and the potential impact of 
the crisis of available resources and political will on the efficacy of the process within the 
African context. The second half of the chapter looks briefly at the role of adoption and 
ratification of the Covenant within the African context to establish the economic, social 
and political relevance and role of the ICESCR in Africa. The chapter then examines 
more extensively African States’ compliance with the State reporting procedure and, 
consequently, the level of their engagement with the CESCR in the establishment of their 
national benchmarks. The United Nations Treaty database served as a portal for primary 
source information for dates of signature and ratification of the Covenant as well as data 
on the status of State reports submitted to the CESCR.  
It is hypothesized that the issues which are inherent to the State reporting process, 
are further exacerbated in the African context by the fact that it requires significant 
political will to submit reports and complete the reporting process. Data from the UN 
                                                 
11 Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
(1987), Vol. 9, Human Rights Quarterly, 122-135. 
12 The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (1998), Vol. 20, 
Human Rights Quarterly, 691-705. 
13 The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 1, “Reporting By States 
Parties”, 24 February 1989, para 6; hereinafter “General Comment No. 1”. 
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Treaty database indicates that the majority of African States do not report or complete the 
process as the data demonstrates. African States, as a result of not reporting, do not 
engage with the CESCR and are therefore not engaged with it in national benchmarking 
processes. Chapter three thus concludes that State reporting, as a benchmarking process, 
is significantly impaired in Africa because it requires the application of a high degree of 
political will. 
Chapter four tests this hypothesis by looking at the relationship between resource 
constraints, compliance with the obligation to submit periodic reports and levels of 
human development (as an indication of the realization of ESCRs). The basic objective of 
the comparability between African and Commonwealth Caribbean States is to test the 
reasonableness of the assertion of chapters two and three that benchmarks and 
benchmarking processes towards the realization of ESCRs are less impacted in the 
African context by the level of resources available to the State than by political will. To 
this end, data from the UNDP’s Human Development Index14 was compiled. African 
States parties’ ranks were extracted from the index and thence used to reaffirm the 
position that African States persistently lag behind the rest of the world in the realization 
of ESCRs. The second half of the chapter looks at States with comparable levels of 
economic resources in the English speaking Caribbean15 to determine if States with 
similar resource based constraints demonstrate similar levels of compliance with the 
                                                 
14 “The HDI – human development index – is a summary composite index that measures a country's 
average achievements in three basic aspects of human development: longevity, knowledge, and a decent 
standard of living. Longevity is measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge is measured by a 
combination of the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment 
ratio; and standard of living by GDP per capita (PPP US$).” Human Development Reports, 
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/indic_242_1_1.html. 
15 The English Speaking Caribbean or Common Wealth Caribbean is chosen because of its historic and 
economic comparability to Africa as well as availability of information to the writer. States in the Common 
Wealth Caribbean are: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, 
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. 
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obligation to submit periodic reports and similar levels of human development. It is 
shown that levels of human development and compliance with the obligation to submit 
periodic reports are not significantly affected by the availability of economic resources. 
Data from the UN Treaty Database, the UNDP’s HDI and world GDP (PPP) figures from 
the IMF are used to substantiate this comparative discussion.  
As it is shown that compliance with the obligation to submit periodic reports and 
levels of human development are not significantly impacted by the level of available 
economic resources, it is concluded that they, and ultimately the realization of ESCRs in 
Africa are more significantly impacted by political will. Chapter five briefly summarizes 
the previous chapters and this conclusion and proposes the broader implications of this. 
 
 
1.4 BACKGROUND OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
 
1.4.1 Historical Background of the Development of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
 
Since the end of WWI, the international community has consistently struggled to 
reconcile notions associated with the concept of ‘Human ‘Rights’ with the role of states 
in the protection and promotion of these rights. States historically have been 
unswervingly reluctant to engage in any sort of conduct or agreement that could possibly 
violate their sovereign right to determine and regulate all the affairs within their territory. 
This reluctance, and in most cases, the outright refusal to have this right limited, has been 
a constant thorn in the side of the international community as attempts are made to 
improve the lives of millions across the globe. 16 
                                                 
16 Mower Jnr., A. International Cooperation for Social Justice: Global and Regional Protection of 
Economic/Social Rights, (1985),10-11. 
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With the gross atrocities of WWII in the social, political and cultural backdrop, the 
international community created the UN Charter which established the UN in 194517 and 
ushered in a new era in the promotion and protection of human rights. This charter, 
though containing a preamble and seven articles dealing with human rights18, “…did not 
contain a specific definition of human rights nor specific arrangements for their 
implementation.”19 It did, however, create an institution which, through various other 
treaties, declarations and customary international law, would develop a global human 
rights system that would further question, challenge and develop the definition of and 
discourse on human rights and the undertaking of the promotion, protection and 
enforcement of them by the institution as well as by the international community.20 At the 
core of this global system is the International Bill of Human Rights (IBHR). 
The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)21 created a body, the Commission on 
Human Rights (CHR)22, which was charged with dealing with these issues specifically 
through the development and implementation of an international Bill of Rights. Created 
over a period of twenty years, it now encompasses the UN’s three pronged approach to 
the global protection and promotion of human rights. The three legs of this system 
include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights23, the International Covenant on Civil 
                                                 
17 UN Charter, 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945, preamble. 
18 Ibid,  preamble, article 1(3), article 13(1b), article 55, article 56, article 62(2), article 68, article 76(c).   
19 Mower Jnr., A.),11.    
20 Other such Covenants include: The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(1965), The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1980), The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), and the International Convention Against Torture (1987). 
21 ECOSO was established under the UN Charter article 7(1) as the principal organ to coordinate economic, 
social, and related work of the 14 UN agencies, 10 functional commissions and five regional commissions.  
22 The CHR was established by ECOSOC acting under article 68 of the UN Charter, at its first meeting on 
10 December 1946. The Commission on Human Rights has been dissolved and the Human Rights Council, 
established by GA resolution 60/251 15 March 2006, is now charged with addressing human rights 
violations.   
23 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
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and Political Rights24 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights25. Together they bind states through the force of their great moral authority, 
ratification/accession processes and customary international law to certain standards and 
duties. The UDHR, though merely a declaration and therefore not binding (at the time), it 
set the stance of the international community with regards to human rights primarily by 
expressing the moral foundation of human rights and basic fundamental freedoms as well 
as by enumerating them. But, while finally expressing these fundamental rights, the 
UDHR was still a far cry from crystallizing what these rights entailed and how they were 
to be promoted, protected and enforced, particularly by states. It lists mostly civil and 
political rights26 and economic, social and cultural rights27 and a limited number of group 
rights28 as most of the rights listed are individual rights. It was, however, envisaged that 
the CHR would tackle issues surrounding the development and enforceability of these 
rights in the form of a binding covenant to which states would formally commit and, 
therefore, be bound to. However, an ideological battle, separated along a Western versus 
Eastern bloc delegations line, ensued within the commission regarding the structure of 
this covenant. The result of this confrontation was the birth of two covenants; the ICCPR 
and ICESCR.29  
The Western bloc delegations argued for two separate covenants on the basis that the 
legislative as well as implementation measures required for dealing with and realizing 
ESCRs were entirely different from those required for civil and political rights. The 
                                                 
24 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entry into force 1976). 
25 The International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (entry into force 1976).  
26 Ibid, articles 3-21. 
27 Ibid articles 17, 22-27. 
28 The UDHR makes references to men (Preamble and Article 16(1)) and women (Preamble and Article 
16(1)), the family (Article12, 16(1) 16(3), 23(3) 25(1)) as well as racial (Article 26(2)) and religious groups 
(Article 26(2)). 
29Mower Jnr., A., 15-18. 
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inclusion of ESCRs, it was believed, would therefore produce an instrument that could 
not essentially be put into effect. The Eastern bloc delegations argued for the preservation 
of the balanced conception of the human as is expounded in the UDHR and stressed the 
indivisibility of ESCRs and civil and political rights.30 After much debate within the 
commission and the various subgroups involved with the drafting of the covenants, the 
GA’s Third Committee recommended that the CHR draft two separate covenants which 
would be submitted and opened for signature at the same time.31  The ICCPR and the 
ICESCR were thus birthed on 16 December1966 and entered into force the 26 March 
1976 and the 3 January 1976 respectively. 
 Prior to their finalization, the General Assembly (GA) stressed that though separate, 
the rights espoused in both Covenants should be regarded as interconnected and 
interdependent.32 It is maintained that while this was a seemingly strong base to build the 
interpretation and implementation of human rights standards, the final result has echoed 
much of the Western bloc’s anxieties, and has since handicapped the international 
community’s ability to truly promote, protect and enforce ESCRs. The idea that ESCRs 
are of a fundamentally different nature from civil and political rights, particularly with 
regards to their implementation and enforceability survived the ideological battle between 
the East and the West during the drafting process and remains today of the major 
                                                 
30For further discussion on the development of two separate covenants on civil and political and ESCR see: 
Craven, M., “The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”  in Hanski, R. & Suksi, 
M. An Introduction to the International Protection of Human Rights (1999), 101-102 , Mower Jnr., A., 15-
18 and Dennis, M. & Stewart, D., “Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Should there an 
international complaints mechanism to adjudicate the rights to food, water, housing and health” (2004), 
Vol. 98, American Journal of International Law, 476-482. 
31 Mower Jnr.,A., 17-18. 
32 Preparation of Two Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, GA Resolution 543 (VI) 5 February 
1952 . 
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impediments to realization of economic social and cultural rights.33 Civil and political 
rights have since been given more attention by human rights activists and groups, NGOs, 
governments and at the UN level through the work and decisions of the quasi-judicial 
body, the Human Rights Committee34.35 Thus, while ESCRs are legally elevated to the 
same binding level as civil and political rights, they are, in practice far less recognized as 
justiciable and capable of implementation due to the persistent belief that ESCRs are not 
immediately realizable, too resource intensive and non-enforceable. 
 
1.4.2 Introduction To and Overview of The International Covenant On 
Economic, Social And Cultural Rights 
 
Ultimately, the Covenant is the only universal human rights instrument which deals 
extensively with the whole range of economic, social and cultural rights, and it is 
primarily by reference to the Covenant that this category of rights is to be 
understood.36 
 
                                                 
33 See: Alston, P. &Quinn, G., “The Nature and Scope of States Parties' Obligations under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (1987) Vol. 9(2) Human Rights Quarterly, 156- 229, 
Leckie, S., “Another Step Towards Indivisibility: Identifying the Key Features of Violations of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (1998) Vol. 20, Human Rights Quarterly, 81-124 and Scott, C., “Reaching 
Beyond (Without Abandoning) the Category of “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” (1999), Vol. 21(3) 
Human Rights Quarterly, 633-660 for more details on current debates on the status of economic, social and 
cultural rights. 
34 The Human Rights Committee is the body of independent experts that monitors implementation of the 
ICCPR by its State parties. The committee monitors compliance through State reports which each party is 
obliged to submit regularly on how the rights are being implemented. The Committee is also equipped to 
handle interstate as well as individual complaints as is provided for by article 41 of the Covenant and the 
First Optional Protocol to the Covenant respectively. Through these mechanisms, particularly the 
individual complaints mechanism, the Committee has developed jurisprudence on the enforcement on Civil 
and Political Rights. 
35 See: Ferina Tinta, M., “Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and Notions” (2007), Vol. 29, Human Rights 
Quarterly,434 and footnotes 8 and 9, and Civil and Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee, Fact 
Sheet No. 15 at www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf. 
Worldwide NGOs such as Human Rights Watch have historically been more concerned with the protection 
of civil and political rights than with economic, social and cultural rights. In recent times Human Rights 
Watch has admitted to have started paying more attention to addressing ESCRs violations. 
(www.hrw.org/doc/?t=esc) 
36 Craven, M.,105. 
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The covenant, in its six sections, reaffirms the moral basis for human rights as being 
founded in the inherent dignity of the human person, reiterates certain civil and political 
rights as well as for the first time, articulates ESCRs and lays the foundation for their 
interpretation and implementation. These six sections are broken into a preamble and 31 
articles which are grouped in five parts.  
The preamble, almost exactly worded37 as that in the ICCPR, provides a framework 
for interpreting the rights to follow in Parts I through IV and asserts their great moral 
importance by echoing the idea of the inherent dignity of the human person found in the 
UDHR as the basis for all human rights. It, more importantly, underscores the 
indivisibility of civil and political rights and ESCRs by stating that the ideal of free 
human beings enjoying freedom from want can only be enjoyed if conditions are created 
whereby everyone can enjoy both ESCRs as well as civil and political rights. This 
essentially suggests that both the ICCPR and IESCR should be interpreted and applied 
jointly and that the rights expounded in both instruments are therefore inextricably 
linked.38  
Part One of the covenant solely consists of article one and is exactly worded as article 
one of the ICCPR. In three small sub-sections, it asserts the right of all peoples to 
political association, self determination39 and the free disposition of their natural wealth 
and resources. Though similarly worded to Part one of the ICCPR and includes the same 
rights, these rights are to be construed as economic rights and or conditions necessary for 
the realization of ESCRs. Further, it can be said that the inclusion of self-determination in 
                                                 
37 The wording is exactly the same except for the inclusion of the words “civil and political freedom” in the 
third stanza of the ICCPR. 
38 Craven, M., 103. 
39 Self determination is largely confined to the colonial context in sub-section 3. 
13 
the ICESCR can be said to be a necessary context for the realization of economic, social 
and cultural rights.40   
Part two, consisting of articles two to five, further sets the context for the 
interpretation and application of the covenant. Article two, which is of particular 
importance to this study, espouses in three sub-sections, the obligation of states parties to 
take steps individually and through international assistance and co-operation to the 
maximum of available resources towards the progressive full realization of the rights 
recognized in the covenant41. It continues stating that the application of these rights will 
be undertaken non-discriminatorily42 and that developing countries with due regard to 
their economies have the right to decide to what extent they are able to extend economic 
social and cultural rights to non-nationals.43 Craven44 argues that article 2(1) reflects the 
belief held during the drafting process that the implementation of ESCRs could only be 
undertaken progressively as full implementation was beyond the means and resources of 
many States. This is to be revisited in chapter two. 
Article three reaffirms the obligation to ensure the equal rights of men and women 
(placing this within the context of ESCRs) and articles four and five set the conditions for 
the limitations of and derogations from the provisions of the covenant.  
Parts three and four of the Covenant, which span articles six to 15 and 16 to 25 
respectively, comprise the core of the covenant. Of the rights mentioned in Part three are 
the rights to safe and healthy working conditions45, social security46, free and compulsory 
                                                 
40 Craven, M., 103. 
41 ICESCR, Article 2(1). 
42 Ibid, Article 2(2). 
43 Ibid, Article 2(3). 
44 Craven, M., 107. 
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46 Ibid, Article 9. 
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primary education47, and an adequate standard of living including adequate food, clothing 
and housing, and the continuous improvement of living conditions48. Though some of the 
rights espoused in the Covenant are listed elsewhere such as in certain instruments of the 
International Labour Organisation49 and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms 
of Racial Discrimination50, the Covenant is said to, for the first time, list a full range of 
ESCRs extensively and comprehensively. Also, many of the rights, particularly cultural 
rights, listed in the Covenant made their international treaty debut as a result of this 
Convention. Rights such as that to health, housing and cultural life were, at the time, not 
found elsewhere.51  
Part four can be called the machinery of the covenant as it sets forth the method for 
gauging compliance with and the enforcement of the treaty, the state reporting system,52 
as well as the supervisory roles of the Secretary General and the ECOSOC.53The 
Covenant stipulates that States, on ratifying the treaty, are to furnish reports in stages on 
measures they have adopted and progress made in achieving the observance of the rights 
recognized in the Covenant. The Committee thence reviews the report and engages the 
State in a series of dialogues which they deal with issues of implementation and 
enforcement, national benchmarking as well as make recommendations and suggestions.  
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Part V, articles 26 to 31, details the general administrative terms and conditions of the 




 The ICESCR, part of the international community’s wider system for the 
promotion, protection and enforcement of all human rights, is the only international 
instrument within this system that deals extensively with ESCRs.57 It is thus primarily 
through this Covenant that the interpretation and implementation of ESCRs is to be 
undertaken. It is maintained that though the Covenant is an extensive assortment of 
rights, the broadness with which they are dealt and the weak, vague language of the 
obligations to undertake and enforce them is a direct result of the ideological differences 
that engulfed the drafting process. It is further maintained that comparisons between civil 
and political rights and pursuant perceptions of ESCRs as non-enforceable and not 
capable of immediate implementation still persist. These two issues are not only reflected 
in the legal and scholarly discourse developed to expound the Covenant (as well as 
current literature on the subject) but has also negatively affected the realization of 
ESCRs. This is to be further demonstrated in chapter two. 
Chapter two will look critically at Article 2(1) of the Covenant and extract the 
most important terms and provisions of obligations. It will thence examine the 
benchmarks set in the Covenant itself, General Comments of the CESCR, The Limburg 
Principles as well as the Maastricht Guidelines for measuring States’ compliance with 
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obligations under the Covenant. It is to be argued that the weak, vague and broad manner 
which the Covenant and its expounding documents frame positive obligations and the 
benchmarks for measuring them require significant political will.  
Chapter three will focus specifically on State reporting as a benchmarking 
process. It will first analyze the reporting system and some of the issues that generally 
plague it. It will thence examine compliance with the obligation to submit periodic 
reports and the implication of this on national benchmarking in the African context. It 
will be argued that the issues that plague the reporting system are further exacerbated in 
the African context as it requires significant political will on the part of State parties to 
submit reports and complete the reporting process. The chapter will then conclude by 
taking the position that both State reporting and the vague, imprecise and broad 
benchmarks set by the Covenant and its expounding documents are significantly 
impacted by the role of political will in African States. 
Chapter four tests this assertion by looking at the relationship between resource 
constraints, compliance with the obligation to submit periodic reports and levels of 
human development (as an indication of the realization of ESCRs). It will undertake a 
comparative analysis of specific African and Commonwealth Caribbean States to 
determine if States with similar resource based constraints demonstrate similar levels of 
compliance with the obligation to submit periodic reports and similar levels of human 
development. It will be shown that levels of human development and compliance with the 
obligation to submit periodic reports are not significantly impacted by the level of 
available economic resources. This will eliminate the crisis of available resources as a 
significant factor affecting benchmarking processes and, ultimately, the realization of 
17 
ESCRs in Africa. It will thus be concluded that the current benchmarks for measuring 
State obligation to the end of the full realization of ESCRs in Africa is more significantly 
impacted by a lack of political will. Chapter five will briefly summarize the previous 
chapters and this conclusion and then propose its broader implications for the realization 

























CHAPTER 2: THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF STATE PARTY 




 ESCRs, since the drafting of the Covenant, have almost always been discussed, 
contrasted or their justiciability questioned and or refuted in direct relation to civil and 
political rights. The nature and scope of the legal obligations associated with these rights, 
likewise, have mainly been referred to or compared with those relating to civil and 
political rights. This referent comparison is hinged primarily on the stark differences 
between the manner the Covenants frame the pursuant obligations of State parties.  
This chapter will present a brief historical background of the alleged differences 
between civil and political rights and ESCRs. It will then propose that the benchmarks for 
measuring positive State obligations are not significantly affected by the nature of ESCRs 
but rather because they are imprecise and broad and therefore require significant political 
will on the part of State parties to fully engage with them. It will affirm this position by 
first outlining the role and constituents of effective benchmarking. Using these guidelines 
the chapter will thence look at the text of the Covenant, several of the general comments 
of the CESCR, the Limburg Principles and other expounding documents and critically 
analyse their strengths and weaknesses as benchmarks in order to establish the potential 






2.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE NATURE OF ESCRS 
Alston and Quinn58 observe that the most commonly drawn distinction between 
civil and political rights and ESCRs is between negative and positive rights. Civil and 
political rights are characterized as negative because the Covenant has been interpreted as 
primarily requiring States not to act in ways that violate the rights it upholds. There is 
thus, an obligation not to act counter to the provisions and purpose of the treaty. They 
develop this by stating that ESCRs are often regarded as positive rights because they are 
viewed as requiring the active intervention of governments for their realization.59 The 
obligation therefore, of the State, is framed in a positive, interventionist way.60 
Consequent distinctions between the two sets of rights are that civil and political rights, 
because of their negative nature and the ensuing negative obligations placed on States, 
are considered relatively easier to define and therefore more readily enforceable and 
hence justiciable. ESCRs, on the other hand, because of the positive obligations and the 
interventionist requirement of the State, are largely “considered to be inherently 
intractable and unmanageable and are thus much too complex to be dealt with under the 
rubric of rights”.61 Further, ESCRs were often seen as directives and not giving rise to 
any substantive or legally binding obligations.62 Thus, civil and political rights were often 
regarded as requiring “obligations of conduct” while ESCRs required “obligations of 
result”.63 A further distinction resulting from this positive-negative characterization is 
that civil and political rights are considered less costly while ESCRs are considered 
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resource intensive because of the positive obligations and interventionist requirements 
espoused by the Covenant.  
Ferina Tinta64 argues that responses to these conceptions of ESCRs did two 
things. One, they served to assert that all human rights entailed both positive and negative 
obligations. Secondly, they did not succeed in breaking the positive- negative framework 
in which the rights were commonly discussed. She argues that in the attempt to break the 
positive-negative conception of the rights comparisons were often made between the two 
sets of rights, showing the similarities between the rights. This exercise, however, served 
to reinforce the idea that there were indeed two sets of rights; creating a type of “legal 
fiction”.65  The long-term effect of this has been that the defence of ESCRs as legitimate 
legal rights acknowledges, to a certain extent, that they have a handicapped legal nature 
and problems of applicability.66 This study will thus argue that the benchmarks set by the 
Covenant and its expounding documents to measure States’ compliance with obligations 
under the Covenant is, in Africa, not affected by the inherent nature of the rights per se. 
The benchmarks are rather affected by the combination of two things. One, that the vast 
majority of African States do not submit State reports and therefore do not engage with 
the CESCR in processes that facilitate national benchmarking. And two, because the 
terms and conditions used to describe and establish benchmarks relevant to the 
obligations under the Covenant are vague and do not provide objective, measurable 
standards or criteria. These two factors, in turn, require that States engaging with the 
benchmarks have high levels of political will to fully interpret and engage the 





benchmarks and consequently drive the realization of ESCRs. The latter will be 
addressed in the next three sections of the chapter and the former in chapter three. 
 
2.3 CONSTITUENTS OF EFFECTIVE BENCHMARKING 
Benchmarking, as the term is used in human rights discourse, refers to target and 
or goal setting which is specific to [or reflective of] a State’s individual circumstances.67 
Since the objective of goal and target setting by the State is to get it to gauge its 
responsibilities, priorities and thence the rate at which it can perform its obligations, 
benchmarking must primarily be undertaken by the State.  
With regards to international instruments such as the ICESCR, benchmarking 
functions at numerous levels. It not only allows States to engage with the terms and 
conditions of the Covenant and thence create standards that are reflective of its economic, 
political, social and cultural circumstances, it also (by virtue of its target setting function) 
is a means of monitoring and measuring States’ compliance with their obligations under 
the Covenant. The CESCR General Comment No. 168 in paragraph six states: 
A fifth objective is to provide a basis on which the State party itself, as well as the Committee, can 
effectively evaluate the extent to which progress has been made towards the realization of the 
obligations contained in the Covenant. For this purpose, it may be useful for States to identify specific 
benchmarks or goals against which their performance in a given area can be assessed. Thus, for 
example, it is generally agreed that it is important to set specific goals with respect to the reduction of 
infant mortality, the extent of vaccination of children, the intake of calories per person, the number of 
persons per health-care provider, etc. In many of these areas, global benchmarks are of limited use, 
whereas national or other more specific benchmarks can provide an extremely valuable indication of 
progress. 
 
It is evident from this extract of General Comment No. 1 that the CESCR was 
cognizant of the fact that States’ varying socio-economic situations render universal 
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benchmarks useless. It thus envisioned a process whereby States would identify specific 
national goals with regard to the realization of the rights espoused in the Covenant. The 
result of this is not only to be the creation of the benchmark or a method of self 
evaluation for the State but also a means by which the Committee is able to evaluate a 
State’s progress towards the realization of ESCRs. Chapman confirms this by stating that 
critical to the systematic monitoring of ESCRs is “the delineation of performance 
standards…in the form of indicators and benchmarks, making possible the identification 
of problems and potential major violations.”69 She goes further to state that “the primary 
use of benchmarks is to offer a tool to asses the performance of States in reaching the 
goals they have set for a particular interval of time as part of the process of fulfilling their 
obligations.”70 Greene states also that “…human rights benchmarks measure performance 
relative to individually defined standards.”71  
It is argued that for international instruments such as the ICESCRs States and the 
CESCR do this primarily through the State reporting procedure and through engaging 
with the Covenant and supporting literature which expound the nature and scope of their 
obligations under the Covenant. To explore this the rest of this chapter will look critically 
at Article 2(1) of the Covenant, the CESCR General Comments, the Limburg Principles 
and the Maastricht Guidelines as they pronounce States’ obligations under the Covenant 
as well as develop critical criteria and principles for their interpretation, implementation, 
and enforcement. In their latter role, they have developed “goals” and “targets” with 
regard to States’ obligations under the Covenant. Based on the context set by General 
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Comment No.1 for the use and importance of benchmarks as well as their noted general 
function and recognition in human rights discourse, it is proposed that the following serve 
as criteria for the discussions in parts 2.4 through 2.5 which will assess the effectiveness 
of benchmarks set by the Covenant and its expounding documents. Thus, an effective 
benchmarks must be: 
1) Specific- to national needs and socio-economic and political circumstances. 
2) Universally recognizable- though the creation of the benchmark is specific to 
each country it must still be an external, objective standard that is 
recognizable outside of the State particularly for monitoring and measuring 
States’ compliance. 
3) Measurable- qualitatively and quantitatively. 
4) Framed in positive terms - as human rights require States to actively fulfil 
their obligations under the Covenant, the goals and targets they set should 
reflect and enable States’ positive obligations.  
It is further proposed that where benchmarks do not meet the above stated criteria there is 
a far greater burden on States to engage with, interpret and apply them for themselves. 
Further, where these criteria have not been met, effective benchmarking towards the 
realization of ESCRs would require that States engage with the CESCR through the State 
reporting procedure and or drive the domestic interpretation, application and 
implementation of the benchmarks themselves. It will be argued that this requires 






2.4 BENCHMARKS OF THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF LEGAL 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE COVENANT: ARTICLE 2(1)  
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of 
its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant by all means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.72  
 
 The text of this subsection of article two is the primary source of the obligations 
of State parties towards the realization of all the rights espoused in the Covenant.73 It is 
argued that because of the conception of and preoccupation with the alleged differences 
in the nature of ESCRs which engulfed the Covenant’s drafting process, this subsection 
of the Covenant is a careful, deliberate assembly of words which imply both obligations 
of conduct and result but in a vague and imprecise manner that serves not to bind States 
in an unyielding or static way.  
The terms and phrasing of this subsection reflect many of the pre-occupations 
held by representatives during the drafting process who believed that ESCRs, because of 
their resource intensive nature, could only be undertaken progressively.74 The inclusion 
of specific words such as “undertakes to take steps”, “maximum available resources” and 
“to achieve progressively the full realization” is the result of serious compromises and 
debates that took place over how binding the obligations to implement, enforce, and 
protect such resource intensive rights should be.75    During the drafting process, a 
majority of State representatives preferred the phrase “to take steps” versus “to 
guarantee” as it was believed that “guarantee” implied a formal obligation of conduct to 
secure the rights. This, it was believed, was beyond what could be expected of States and 
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as such, the phrase “undertakes to take steps” was used instead of “guarantee”.76 Though 
chosen for the manner in which it does not bind States in a precise manner, this phrase 
has been said to be of the clearer more precise legal obligations in this subsection as it 
implies a clear legal obligation of conduct. While it was agreed that full realization of 
ESCRs could not be realized immediately, it is said to imply from the wording “to take 
steps” that active steps be taken either immediately, before or within a reasonably short 
time after ratification of the Covenant.77 Leckie78 states as well that the obligation to take 
steps indicates inter alia that States assume some immediate legal duties upon ratification 
of the Covenant. Craven asserts further that this wording implies that even though the 
realization of ESCRs is to be progressive, it is not open to States to delay indefinitely 
their implementation.79  
 Not only are States to act immediately towards the realization of ESCRs, they are 
to do so “individually and through international assistance and co-operation”. This 
wording qualifies the active steps of States in that it states what kinds of actions States 
are to undertake. It is clear from this that States have an obligation to act individually 
towards the end of progressive realization but, it also implies that States are to actively 
seek assistance, co-operate and engage with the international community. The duties 
surrounding this aspect of the obligation to actively take steps towards the realization of 
ESCRs have, however, been widely debated as the Covenant is not clear on what 
international assistance and co-operation mean and or entail. The phrase has often been 
interpreted as an obligation of richer, more industrialized countries to actively assist 
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poorer, less developed countries in the fulfilment of the terms of the Covenant.80 At the 
time of the drafting of the Covenant, it was conceded by a majority of representatives that 
developing States would need international assistance (from developed States) if they 
were truly and effectively to promote, protect and enforce ESCRs.81 This position was 
justified on, among other things, the grounds that the development of poorer countries 
was directly linked to resources over which developed countries exerted primary control 
as well as that less developed countries were owed international assistance by more 
developed countries as reparation for the raping of their economies and resources under 
colonialism.82 This concession seems to indicate that there was some preoccupation 
regarding the ability of developing nations to fully realize ESCRs given the constraint in 
resources which they faced. This study is therefore particularly concerned with the 
obligation to use “maximum available resources” as it has posited whether a constraint in 
resources is the significant factor in States’ engagement with benchmarking processes 
and hence the realization of ESCRs.  
“Maximum available resources” places an obligation on States to gauge, based on 
their circumstances, what they can devote towards the realization of ESCRs. Again, to 
avoid placing States under a static and unyielding obligation, the drafters of the Covenant 
agreed on wording that would allow States to progressively achieve the standards of the 
Covenant within the context of their varying socio-economic realities.83 This wide scope, 
however, raises some critical implications for the efficacy of the benchmark in resource 
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stricken States as well as those that lack political to promote, enforce and implement 
ESCRs.  
Though the obligation of conduct to expend resources to achieve ESCRs is 
apparent, the scope, as is implied by the wording of this subsection is vague. The term 
“maximum available” does not adequately specify in measurable terms the extent of the 
obligation as there are no provisions for a qualitative or quantitative assessment of 
compliance with the obligation. This places the onus on the State to unravel the 
obligation (given its socio-economic circumstances), create benchmarks and then actively 
work towards them. This requires a significant amount of political will to undertake. The 
effectiveness of “maximum available” as a benchmark, as it highly dependent on political 
will, will be severely curtailed in States that do not or will not engage it on this level. 
Secondly, from a plain reading of this subsection, it can only but be assumed that it is left 
to the State to gauge its own compliance. It is not clear whether the treaty supervising 
body, the international community and or other international bodies are also charged with 
scrutinizing compliance with this obligation. Moreover, if they are overtly charged with 
doing so, to what extent and, what criteria should be used to gauge compliance? The 
Covenant, particularly this subsection, is silent on a means of measuring compliance with 
this obligation as it offers no external, objective standard outside the State which can be 
used to judge its actions. Alston and Quinn thus ask “…why it is necessary, or even 
appropriate, to have an international treaty if each State Party is to be held accountable, 
with respect to the central element in the obligation, to itself”.84  
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Robertson85 argues that in a modern State public and private resources are used 
for purposes which ultimately relate to ESCRs. In light of this he questions the extent to 
which States should be criticized for directing inadequate resources towards objectives 
international law holds as a higher purpose. He goes further to state that the issue of the 
obligation to use maximum available resources has been largely undeveloped due to the 
inability of human rights advocates and authoritative bodies to articulate standards of 
State performance which give [precise] definition and usefulness to the terms in article 
two of the Covenant.86 He maintains that without any true articulation and development 
of the standards associated with this obligation, any assessment of State performance in 
this area will lack vigour and ESCRs will continue to be viewed as idealistic rhetoric and 
not binding legal obligations of conduct and result.87 Moreover it can be said that without 
this articulation and development, those States which do not have the political will to 
fully engage them consistently experience lower levels of ESCRs realization.  
Unlike its sister Covenant (the ICCPR) which obliges States to undertake their 
responsibilities under the treaty immediately88, the ICESCR requires States to “achieve 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant”. The phrasing and 
conceptual basis of this obligation is directly linked to the obligation to expend maximum 
available resources. This link arose out of the resounding desire to create obligations that 
would bind States but in a manner cognizant of and appropriate for States’ varying socio-
economic realities89. Alston and Quinn note that this conceptualization of progressive 
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achievement which links the issue of the varying availability of State resources and the 
full realization of the rights of the Covenant mirrors the inevitable contingent nature of 
State obligations and therefore ask whether the nature of this obligation is so contingent 
as to rob it of any normative significance.90  
Alston and Quinn point out from the drafting history of the Covenant that though 
the word “progressive” functions as a limitation it is not to be invoked by States as basis 
for failing to fulfil their obligations under the Covenant.91 The word essentially 
accommodates the varying economic realities of each State, binds States to their 
obligations with relation to their available resources and allows for the implementation of 
rights that were seen to be immediately unrealizable.92 Moreover, the word “progressive” 
was seen to introduce a dynamic element of continuity to the Covenant which 
demonstrated that there was no fixed goal for the implementation and realization of 
ESCRs.93  However, while it is clear that States must take immediate steps towards the 
achievement of the rights outlined in the Covenant according to the availability of their 
resources, it is largely unclear from the Covenant how this obligation of result is to be 
measured or assessed. The wording “full realization” describes a desired result and its 
vagueness leaves it up to the State to unravel what its positive steps toward that end 
should look like and to develop criteria on which to measure and assess its progress. It is 
argued that while the obligation of progressive realization is debatably the most salient 
feature of the Covenant it also quite problematic. It sets the pace at which each State is to 
undertake its obligations and while its intent is to allow each State to do so for itself its 
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vagueness will affect its effectiveness as a benchmark in States that do not have the 
political will to engage with it rigorously. 
The strength of the manner with which the Covenant deals with the nature 
obligations in article 2(1) is primarily that it is cognizant of and attempts to accommodate 
States’ varying socio-economic realities. This is rooted in the idea that while ESCRs are 
of utmost importance, the implementation of the majority of these rights may not be 
immediate, the process of their implementation is immediate and continuous. It is 
conceded that many of the debates and preoccupations about the nature of ESCRs which 
characterized the drafting process are reflected in the wording of many of the Covenant’s 
provisions. It has therefore been necessary to work towards defining, developing, and 
establishing not only the nature of the rights espoused in the Covenant, many of the terms 
and provisions which imply and require legal obligations of conduct and result, as well as 
their benchmarks. The following section will review such attempts. 
 
 
2.5 BENCHMARKS SET BY THE LIMBURG PRINCIPLES, THE CESCR 
AND OTHER EXPOUNDING DOCUMENTS  
 
2.5.1 Introduction  
 
For many years after the treaty’s entry into force the lack of consensus that 
overshadowed its drafting process still persisted internationally regarding the 
interpretation and application of the terms of the Covenant.94 It was believed that this 
persistent lack of consensus was one of the major inhibitors to real and effective 
implementation and enforcement of ESCRs ten years into the treaty’s life.95 Thus, in June 
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1986, a group of 29 international legal experts met to attempt to agree upon and thence 
establish principles for the interpretation and implementation of the treaty. The result was 
the creation of 103 principles that have been said to clarify many of the terms and 
provisions of the treaty particularly those concerning the nature and scope of State Party 
obligations and their benchmarks.96 The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights97, have since been 
issued as a UN document98 and have played a very critical role in the development of the 
understanding of many of the provisions and obligations in the Covenant as well as in the 
production of scholarly and UN produced documents on the implementation, 
enforcement, protection and violation of ESCRs.99   
In 1987, a year after the adoption of The Principles, Committee Chair, Phillip 
Alston, asserted that the CESCR still needed to further examine and unravel the nature of 
State parties’ obligation under the Covenant.100 Of particular import to Alston in Article 
2(1) of the Covenant was ascertaining and thence defining the meaning of the obligations 
to “take steps” and “to achieving progressively the full realization of rights”. He 
consequently proposed that the Committee draft a document (which, in 1990, became 
General Comment No.3101) that would do exactly this.102  
The relationship between the Limburg Principles and the CESCR’s General 
Comments is interesting as though the Principles were produced by a non-UN body, they 
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have been adopted as a UN document103 and have been said to be influential in the 
content of the Committee’s General Comments particularly General Comment No.3.104 
Though the Principles were slowly recognized by the CESCR 105and not directly cited in 
General Comment No.3, the two documents still reach many of the same conclusions 
particularly as they expound obligations surrounding progressive realization and the use 
of maximum available resources.106 Given the similarities in content on issues dealing 
with the justiciability of ESCRs, progressive realization and available resources, it can be 
inferred that the Principles were substantially taken into consideration during the drafting 
of the Comment.107       
The Limburg Principles were also significant in the content of the Maastricht 
Guidelines. Though their focus is on the implementation of ESCRs they have been said to 
have paved the way for the interpretation of the violations of ESCRs. Dankwa, V., 
Flinterman, C., &Leckie, S. state that: 
The Limburg Principles constitute a first effort to substantiate the meaning of violations of 
economic, social and cultural rights. It was, however, clear that this notion needed more reflection 
and that it would be important to spell out a catalogue of types of violations of economic, social 
and cultural rights. An attempt in this respect has been made…which like the Limburg Principles 
relate primarily to the ICESCR. The guidelines are, however, phrased in a general way so as to 
facilitate their use in the interpretation and application of economic, social and cultural rights 
provided for in either domestic law or other regional and international instruments.108 
 
Thus, arising out of the need to further clarify what violations of ESCRs entailed, a group 
of more than thirty legal experts met in Maastricht on the tenth anniversary of the 
Limburg Principles and unanimously agreed on guidelines which they believed reflected 
                                                 
103 U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1987/17. 
104 Martin,D.L., 197-200. 
105 Ibid; He surmises that this slow recognition had more to do with the general bureaucratic nature of the 
UN rather than opposition to the Principles themselves.  
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid, 197. 
108 Dankwa, V., Flinterman, C., &Leckie, S., 712. 
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the evolution of international law since the advent of the Principles and which could be 
used to understand and determine violations of ESCRs.109 Together, these three 
documents (as well as other General Comments issued by the CESCR have significantly 
clarified the nature and scope of States’ obligations under article 2(1) of the Covenant as 
well as have set benchmarks for their assessment. 
 
2.5.2 Benchmarks for Measuring the Obligation “to take steps” 
Paragraph 16 of subsection B of the Limburg Principles begins by re-affirming 
that all States parties have an obligation to begin immediately “to take steps” towards the 
full realization of the rights contained in the Covenant. Unlike in the Covenant, it is made 
clear in the previous Subsection110 that national action and involvement is required for 
the full realization of the Covenant. Paragraphs 17 through 19 thus state that State parties 
shall, at the national level use legislative, administrative, judicial, economic, social and 
educational measures in order to fulfil obligations under the Covenant. This is important 
as it begins to articulate and emphasize the active role of the State in benchmarking 
processes towards the full realization of ESCRs.  
General Comment No. 3, unlike the Limburg Principles and the Maastricht 
Guidelines, focuses solely on the obligation of conduct; “to take steps”. Of its strengths is 
that it re-iterates both the Covenant and the Limburg Principles by stating that while the 
full realization of ESCRs may be achieved progressively, steps to that end must be taken 
within a reasonably short time after the Covenant’s entry into force. Again, it is 
powerfully stated that though the desired state of the realization of ESCRs will be 
                                                 
109 Ibid, 708. 
110 The Limburg Principles, Part I (A. 10 and A.11). 
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progressive due to States’ varying socio-economic realities, the obligation of conduct to 
this end is immediate.111 Where the Covenant and Principles do not add further to this 
concept, General Comment No.3 qualifies the word “steps” in the progressive realization 
context. It states that the word “steps” implies that States’ actions must be “deliberate”, 
“concrete” and “clearly targeted” towards the realization of ESCRs.112 Later general 
comments consistently reaffirm that State parties must be actively taking these kinds of 
steps. General Comment No. 14 reiterates that the State parties have immediate 
obligations in relation to the right to health and that there is thus an incumbent obligation 
to take steps that are deliberate, concrete and targeted towards the full realization of the 
right to health.113 And, General Comment No. 15114 makes a similar assertion with 
regards to the right to water.115 These words not only elucidate the obligation of the result 
of progressive realization but also the obligation of conduct towards that end.  
General Comment No. 4 states that “[m]easures designed to satisfy a State party’s 
obligations in respect of the right to adequate housing may reflect whatever mix of public 
and private sector measures [are] considered appropriate”116 without expanding what this 
entails. It does, however, state in previous sub-section117 that “the most appropriate 
means of achieving the full realization of the right to adequate housing…will almost 
                                                 
111Eide,A, “Promoting economic, social and cultural rights: Obligations of status and accountability of non-
state actors”, (2000) UNDP Global Forum at: www.undp.org/docs/events/global forum/2000/eide.pdf,  8. 
112General Comment No.3, para 2.  
113 General Comment, No. 14, para 30.  
114 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment Number 15, The Right to 
Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant) UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 20 January 2003; hereinafter “General 
Comment No. 15”. 
115 Ibid, para 17. 
116 The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No.14, The Right to the 
Highest attainable Standard of Health, (Article 12 of the Covenant), UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 
2000, para 14; hereinafter “General Comment No. 14”. 
117 Ibid, para 12. 
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invariably require the adoption of a national housing strategy”118.  Again, it is 
emphasized that the onus is on States to define the objective for the development of 
shelter conditions, identify resources available to meet these goals and the most cost-
effective way of using them as well as set out the responsibilities and time frames for the 
implementation of necessary measures.119 It is argued, that the extent to which States will 
undertake and expend the resources to undergo the processes elaborated in these later 
General Comments will be largely determined by national political will.  
Later General Comments of the CESCR make significant advances from the 
practical and conceptual issues left unaddressed by General Comments Nos.3 and 4. As 
they are right specific, they elaborate on measures appropriate for the realization of their 
relevant rights. It can be said that though definitions of targeted, deliberate and concrete 
are not given, the entire Comment functions as practical and contextual bases for the 
interpretation and implementation of targeted, deliberate and concrete measures. For 
example, General Comment No. 15 states that States should adopt comprehensive and 
targeted measures such as low cost techniques, pricing policies and income supplements 
to ensure that water is affordable.120 It thus sets a framework for States and the 
Committee to gauge compliance with obligations and the realization of the relevant 
rights. It is contended therefore, that the Committee since its earlier General Comments 
has recognized the importance of the inclusion of the specification and elaboration of 
“appropriate”, “targeted”, “deliberate” and “concrete” measures. The efficacy of these 
elaborated benchmarks however, is highly dependent on the political will of States to 
truly engage with them. 
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2.5.3 Benchmarks for Measuring Obligations Relevant to Progressive 
Realization and the Use of Maximum Available Resources 
 
The Limburg Principles’ strengthen the concept of “progressive realization” by 
adding that State parties are obliged to move expeditiously towards the realization of 
ESCRs and that they, under no circumstances, are to interpret this obligation as a right to 
indefinitely defer the realization of the rights outlined in the Covenant.121 Most 
importantly, the Principles also assert that this obligation “exists independently of the 
increase of resources” and, in fact, requires the effective use of available resources.122 
This assertion further strengthens the interpretation of progressive realization as it makes 
it clear that while, as an obligation of result, progressive realization is contingent on 
States’ resources, as an obligation of conduct it is not dependent on States’ resources. 
General Comment No. 3 makes a similar assertion. It states: 
“The concept of progressive realization constitutes a recognition of the fact that full realization of 
all economic social and cultural rights will generally not be able to be achieved in a short period of 
time….Nevertheless, the fact that realization over time, or in other words progressively, is 
foreseen under the Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of all 
meaningful content. It is on the one hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities of 
the real world and the difficulties involved for any country ensuring full realization of economic, 
social and cultural rights. On the other hand, the phrase must be read in the light of the overall 
objective, indeed the rasion d’tre of the Covenant which is to establish clear obligations of State 
parties in respect of the full realization of the rights in question.”123 
 
 General Comment No. 14 similarly states that while the obligation of progressive 
realization acknowledges the constraints of resources in varying States, State parties still 
have an immediate obligation in relation to the right to health such as the guarantee that 
the right will be exercised without discrimination of any kind.124 General Comment No. 
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11, however, very clearly sets grounds for the undertaking of the progressive realization 
of the right to education. It states very precisely that: 
“[A] plan of action must be aimed at securing the progressive implementation of the right to 
compulsory primary education, free of charge, under article 14. Unlike the provision in article 2.1, 
however, article 14 specifies that the target date must be "within a reasonable number of years" 
and moreover, that the time-frame must "be fixed in the plan". In other words, the plan must 
specifically set out a series of targeted implementation dates for each stage of the progressive 
implementation of the plan. This underscores both the importance and the relative inflexibility of 
the obligation in question.”125  
 
This clearly sets a framework for understanding the pace at which States are to develop 
for themselves a plan to achieve compulsory and free primary education and thus gives 
both the State and the Committee criterion which can be used to gauge their compliance 
and achievement. However, this exercise of setting a series of target implementation 
dates for each stage of the progressive implementation plan clearly puts a significant 
amount of onus on the State to develop and follow up with. 
On the issue of resources, The Principles go farther than the Guidelines in its 
expansion of the issue of resource availability as it actually states what constitutes a 
resource126. They state that “available resources” refers to both the resources within a 
State and those available from the international community through international co-
operation and assistance.127 They attempt to further clarify the scope of the obligation to 
use “maximum available resources” by stating that in determining whether adequate 
measures have been taken for the realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant 
attention shall be paid to equitable and effective use of and access to available resources. 
                                                 
125 General Comment No. 11, para 10.  
126 The Maastricht Guidelines merely state in Section II (10) that: In many cases compliance with such 
obligations may be undertaken by most States with relative ease, and without significant resource 
implications. In other cases, however, full realization of the rights may depend on the availability of 
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While this emphasizes that the equitable and effective use of and access to resources must 
be taken into consideration when assessing or measuring state compliance, it still leaves 
the issue of how to gauge what is equitable and effective loose and unqualified. Even 
though this short subsection128 strongly re-affirms that all State parties are obligated to 
fulfil their obligations under the Covenant regardless of their the level of economic 
development, it leaves this awkward yet critical dynamic between the obligation to fully 
realize the terms of the Covenant and the crisis of available resources, largely untouched 
and undeveloped. While it may be the intent of the Comment to have States elucidate for 
themselves what is the equitable and effective use of resources towards the full 
realization of ESCRs entails in their context, this approach assumes at its core that all 
States are sufficiently motivated to undertake such a process.  
General Comment No. 4 makes the assertion that “[r]egardless of the state of 
development of any country, there are certain steps which must be taken immediately”129 
and makes provision for the issue of resource availability and the immediate obligations 
to the end of progressive realization. It refers to the provision in article 2(1) of the 
Covenant for the use of international co-operation and assistance and states that, “[t]o the 
extent that any such steps are considered to be beyond the maximum resources available 
to a State party, it is appropriate that a request be made as soon as possible for 
international cooperation…”130  This seems to suggest that mechanisms such as world 
conferences, international policies and guidelines can not only be used as sources of 
funding but are also important to the benchmarking process and hence the realization of 
ESCRs. The Guidelines mention the 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population 
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Development and the 1995 Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women which set 
standards for the reduction of maternal mortality rates.131 Does this, however, suggest 
that States should be looking to these types of mechanisms to know what the relevant 
standards or benchmarks are as they create their own benchmarks? The Guidelines do not 
explicitly say so. The Committee, however, consistently points to several such types of 
mechanisms in both earlier general and later right specific general comments and refers 
to them as exemplars of benchmarks, sources of guidance and resources and use them 
within the Comment itself to define, clarify and establish the nature and scope of specific 
rights and the obligations which surround them.  
For example, General Comment No.4132 looks to both the Commission on Human 
Settlements and the Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000 for the definition of 
“adequate shelter”133 as well as encourages States to apply the Health Housing 
Principles134 which explicate the relationship between inadequate housing and mortality 
and morbidity rates.135 General Comment No. 14, also maintains that “[t]he realization of 
the right to health may be pursued through numerous complementary approaches, such as 
the formulation of health policies, or the implementation of health programmes 
developed by the World Health Organization (WHO), or the adoption of specific legal 
instruments.”136 This is evidently useful as it provides States with sources which can be 
used as benchmarks themselves or aids as they create national benchmarks. The 
Comments of the Committee are, however, not enforceable against non-complying State 
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parties to the Covenant or international institutions such as the WHO.137 Moreover, the 
language merely “encourages” and “suggests” that States use these mechanisms to the 
end of the realization of ESCRs. This ultimately requires that States, on their own 
volition, refer to, analyze, interpret and domesticate the policies and approaches the 
Comments refer to as guidelines and or benchmarks. It is contended that the extent to 
which States will expend the resources and effort to do this will be largely determined by 
political will. 
General Comment No. 11 states further on the issue of resource availability in 
developing countries that it is aware that the structural adjustment programmes that began 
in the 1970s, the debt crises that followed in the 1980s and the financial crises of the late 
1990s, as well as other factors, have greatly exacerbated the extent to which the right to 
primary education is being denied.138: It however still asserts that: 
[I]n appropriate cases, the Committee encourages States parties to seek the assistance of relevant 
international agencies, including the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, in relation both to the preparation of plans of action 
under article 14 and their subsequent implementation. The Committee also calls upon the relevant 
international agencies to assist States parties to the greatest extent possible to meet their 
obligations on an urgent basis.139 
 
Although provision is made in an attempt to close the gap between immediate obligations 
towards the progressive realization of the right to education and the issue of resource 
availability, the effectiveness of this means of benchmarking expressed in General 
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Comment No.11 will still be largely impacted by States’ desire to engage institutions 
such as the IMF and World Bank for funding and assistance. It is therefore contended that 
though the Comment calls on these institutions to assist States in policies and 
programmes aimed at the realization of the right to education, the efficacy of the this 
route to benchmarking rests primarily on States’ degree of motivation to engage with 
institutions such as these.140 
 
2.5.4 The Minimum Core Obligations Benchmark 
General Comment No. 3 is the first time the concept of “minimum core 
obligations” is introduced as a benchmark of compliance. The Comment stresses that the 
concept of “minimum core obligations” arose out of the extensive experience gained by 
the Committee in reviewing State reports.141 It does not state how this experience 
reviewing States reports led to the concept of minimum core obligations but does state 
that it believes that the obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum 
essential levels of each of the rights in the Covenant is incumbent upon each State. It also 
asserts that this obligation sits at the very core or raison d ‘tre of the Covenant.  
 The Comment attempts to reconcile the issues associated with the availability of 
resources and hence States’ compliance with minimum core obligations by stating (in the 
negative) that if States fail to meet minimum core obligations due to a lack of resources, 
they must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all available resources in a 
manner that satisfies, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.142 Though it 
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must be recognized that this is a significant advancement in the interpretation of the 
Covenant, it must also be said that the comprehensive implementation of ESCRs would 
require a more detailed framework than what is presented in the Comment and its 
assertion143. This is most essential for States that are not meeting their minimum core 
obligations and particularly for those which are simply not engaging with the processes 
towards their fulfilment. 
The Maastricht Guidelines expand this obligation but do so in the negative. The 
Guidelines state that if significant numbers of people in a State are deprived of basic 
foodstuffs, essential primary care, shelter or basic education, then that State is in clear 
violation of the minimum core obligation under the Covenant.144 It also restates that the 
minimum core obligations apply regardless of the availability of resources or any other 
factors145 and further that resource scarcity does not relieve States of certain minimum 
obligations.146 The Guidelines however further purport that given this, the burden is on 
the State to demonstrate that it is making measurable progress towards the full realization 
of ESCRs 147. This is problematic because it does not, again, contextualize, define or 
qualify what “measurable” is and relies on the will of the State to unravel and thence 
demonstrate this. While this is not an impossible feat, it is argued that this takes a 
tremendous amount of political will to fully engage with. 
Later right specific General Comments such as Comment No. 14 outline the 
Committee’s view of minimum core obligations and thus provide States with criteria that 
will be used to assess their level of compliance with the obligation. Comment No.14 
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states that in view of General Comment No. 3, it acknowledges that State parties have 
core obligations to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels 
of the rights enunciated in the Covenant.148 It, however, goes further to offer instruments 
such as the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and 
Development149 and the Alma-Ata Declaration150 as compelling guidelines on the core 
obligations arising from article 12 of the Covenant and thence states the Committee’s 
view on the core obligations associated with the right to health.151 They include access to 
health facilities, goods and services on a non-discriminatory basis152, the provision of 
minimum essential levels of safe and adequate food153 and drugs (as is from time to 
defined under the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs)154, as well as the 
adoption and implementation of a national public health strategy and plan of action.155 
While the strength of the Comment’s approach is that it gives to States upfront the 
criteria on which they will be assessed and points them to relevant guidelines which have 
set international benchmarks regarding the realization of the right to health which can be 
used as they set national benchmarks, its weakness is that it, again, requires that States 
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2.6 CONCLUSION 
 It has been proposed that effective benchmarks are specific to States’ national 
needs and socio-economic and political circumstances, are universally recognizable (i.e. 
an objective standard that is recognizable outside of the State particularly for monitoring 
and measuring States’ compliance), are measurable qualitatively and quantitatively and 
should be framed in positive terms to reflect and enable States’ positive obligations. It 
was thus argued that benchmarks established in the Covenant and its earlier legal and 
scholarly expounding documents are vague, imprecise, sometimes framed in negative, 
and in immeasurable terms. Given that they are the founding documents of ESCRs and 
were consequently and purposefully framed in vague and imprecise terms, their primary 
strength is that they set the groundwork for further development by the CESCR on the 
nature and scope of positive obligations under the Covenant. Later Comments by the 
Committee therefore build on previous concepts and principles and provided substantial 
development in the nature of ESCRs by including specific, measurable standards relating 
to the nature and scope of the obligations under the Covenant. It was further argued, 
however, that because the committee’s later General Comments often point States to 
further guidelines and principles (which then have to be interpreted and implemented 
domestically), they require a significant level of political will on the part of States to 
engage with and thus implement.  
Benchmarks, as have been defined in this chapter, are not just those set by the 
Covenant, the CESCR through its general comments, and other expounding documents. 
Chapter three will thus look at the other manner in which the CESCR envisions and 
facilitates the benchmarking process of State reporting. As this study is concerned with 
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the relative role of resources in benchmarking processes and consequently the realization 
of ESCRS within the African context, chapter three will look at the issues plaguing the 
State reporting system and their implications for African States. The majority of the 
chapter will therefore focus on African States’ compliance with the obligation to engage 
this process as a means of assessing the impact and, in turn, the relative importance of 
resource constraints and political will on this system within the African economic and 
political context. This focus will additionally serve as a background for the investigation 
(in chapter four) which finally illustrates that benchmarking, and hence the realization of 

















CHAPTER 3: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE 
REPORTING AND BENCHMARKING: THE AFRICAN CONTEXT 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The State reporting system, established by the Covenant in articles 16 through 18, 
sets up a mechanism which monitors States’ progress with the realization of ESCRs as 
well as provides them with assistance and recommendations to this end (benchmarking) 
through a concluding observations procedure.  
The relevance of the State reporting procedure to the study is therefore hinged on 
the fact that the Covenant and the CESCR both have consistently established and 
recognized that it is of utmost importance in the creation of national benchmarks.156 Prior 
to assessing the relative importance of resource constraints and political will to the 
benchmarking procedure within the African context, it is essential to examine the process 
and some of the issues that plague its general effectiveness. It is contended that these 
issues are further exacerbated within the African economic and political context by the 
fact that it requires significant political will to submit reports and complete the reporting 
process. It is therefore concluded that State reporting, as a benchmarking process, is 
significantly impaired in Africa by the fact that it requires the application of a high 
degree of political will. Chapter four will support this with a comparative analysis of 
African and Commonwealth Caribbean States’ levels of human development, compliance 
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3.2 INTRODUCTION TO THE ICESCR IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT 
 
States will almost always sign on to any international instrument if it is vague or 
weak enough or, simply if it is politically advantageous to do so. The overwhelming 
majority of signatories to the Covenant should not, therefore, be taken to construe that its 
standards and purposes have been widely accepted and or implemented internationally.  
There are 66 signatories and 156 parties to the Covenant as of July 2007.157 Of 
these, approximately 47 of the just over 50 African States are parties and to the ICESCR 
as of March 2007.158 Among those African States that have neither signed nor ratified the 
Covenant are: Botswana, the Comoros, Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Principe and 
South Africa has signed but not ratified the Covenant159. Clearly, the overwhelming 
majority of States in Africa have signed/ratified the ICESCR and it is surely encouraging 
that almost the entire continent recognizes, in this manner, ESCRs. The regimes of the 
signatories span from failed, to democratic States as well as dictatorships and 
kingdoms160. Given the number of African States that are party to the treaty and the 
variety of political systems they represent, little attention should be paid to which States 
or the types of States that are party to the Covenant. What can be inferred from the 
number of signatories and the economic and political variety however, is that each of 
these States, as parties to the Covenant, at some point were (to some extent) in agreement 
with the rest of the region and the international community on the importance of ESCRs. 
This, given the highly controversial nature of ESCRs globally, should be regarded as a 
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major feat for the continent. It could, additionally be said that that this number indicates 
that there is general agreement across the continent regarding the status of ESCRs as 
legitimate rights within the international human rights system.  
The fact that a state, African or not, has ratified or signed on to a universal set of 
norms is in no way indicative of the fact that they will accept its obligations, fully comply 
with its provisions and undertake them in a manner consistent with the treaty.161 While 
most human rights lawyers and activists would like to think that ratification and 
accession are in some way a signal of a State’s commitment to an international set of 
norms or its political will towards their full realization, it can be said that treaties, 
depending on how politically advantageous they are, can be used as political tools or for 
propaganda purposes. In the African context, it is interesting to note that over half of the 
accessions to the Covenant took place within the first half of the treaty’s life in force.162 
This time period, 1976-1991, followed decolonization and was the era of the birth of 
States across the continent. Many new States in addition to grappling with the 
administrative and political newness of statehood also had to deal with the legacy of their 
colonial pasts.163 It is maintained that Covenants such as the ICCPR and ICESCR not 
only aided in the fight for the fall of colonization and the ushering in of independence but 
on being newly liberated members of the international community it was politically savvy 
to adopt and or recognize as many “important” conventions as possible to appear to be 
willing participants of the international community.164 Most importantly, Covenants such 
as the ICESCR would also prove to be quite important in dealing with the issues of post-
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colonial societies.165 Thus, it can be said that as part of the IBHR, the ICESCR was 
another tool used in the fight for independence and, for newly liberated States, was a core 
around which they could re-build and re-invigorate their emerging societies.166 This had 
the potential for significant impact on these emerging societies as Sates could use them to 
shape newly introduced judicial and political systems; ultimately fulfilling the intent of 
the IBHR to serve as a moral and legal compass for the international community. The 
reality of the ICESCR, however, is that many of the States, though having acceded or 
ratified the Covenant, did not and do not take it seriously, have not incorporated it into 
domestic law, or choose to interpret its provisions in ways which accommodate them to 
existing laws or practices.167 The track records of states such as Sudan and Zimbabwe 
(both of which became signatories to the covenant in the first half of its existence) speak 
volumes on States’ tendency to sign on to treaties with little to no intention of working 
towards its full realization. Mere accession and ratification thus does not give effect to 
rights. It is therefore of utmost importance to monitor States’ progress with the 
implementation of the provisions of a Covenant, their compliance with their obligations, 
and, in the event of their failure to do so in any of these areas, assist, co-operate and or 
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3.3 STATE REPORTING  
3.3.1 The State Reporting Process 
Articles 16, 17 and 18 are the foundation of the Covenant’s reporting system. 
Article 16 (1) establishes the obligation of States to submit reports to the Secretary 
General (SG) which should expound the measures they have taken and the progress 
achieved by undertaking these measures in the overall realization of the promotion, 
protection and enforcement of the rights of the covenant. Article 17 sets the structure of 
the system. In subsection one it gives the task of the supervision of this process to 
ECOSOC which, in turn, is to set up a regulatory program for states’ periodic reports 
within one year of the Covenant’s entry into force.168 Sub-section two briefly describes 
the desired content of these reports as being “factors and difficulties affecting the degree 
of fulfilment of obligations under the covenant”. In an effort to avoid overburdening 
States which are parties to several other Covenants also requiring reports, sub-section 
three of Article 17 allows whatever information furnished in a report produced in 
accordance with the ICESCR to be duplicated. Article 18 allows for the participation of 
specialized agencies in the form of submissions as well. Article 19 broadly set the 
groundwork for a feedback mechanism (which would become the concluding 
observations procedure) within the reporting system as it gives ECOSOC, and, 
ultimately, whichever body it chooses to delegate it to, the power to undertake studies 
and make general recommendations on reports submitted under articles 16 through18.   
Prior to 1985, however, this procedure was rife with inefficiency and dysfunction. 
The primary issue was that the body set up to regulate this process, the Sessional Working 
Group, was a team of governmental experts and therefore not fully equipped to deal with 
                                                 
168 That body eventually became a Sessional Working Group and thence the CESCR. 
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economic, social and cultural human rights issues. The efficacy of the group, and 
essentially the system, was undermined by political dissent, the very shallow manner in 
which the group undertook the reviewing of the reports, the lack of progress in the 
development of guidelines for the reporting system and a failure to include substantive 
comments on the system to ECOSOC.169 It is, however, debatable, just how thorough and 
efficient the review process could have been. The guidelines given in article 17 of the 
Covenant outlining issues and factors to be included in the reports are very vague and 
article 19, which allowed for general recommendations, is equally vague. The 
combination of a dysfunctional, disputing group and vague, underdeveloped guidelines 
led ECOSOC to create the CESCR in 1985.170 Since then, the committee has made some 
significant changes to the system. 
The most significant improvements to the system engendered by CESCR are that 
it clarified and strongly emphasized the obligation of States to report, the content of the 
reports as well as the development and strengthening of the concluding observations 
procedure. In General Comment No.1, the Committee set forth in the first paragraph that 
reporting is not only a procedural matter designed solely to satisfy each State party's 
formal obligation to submit a report but the process and preparation of the report itself 
served several objectives which were instrumental to the letter and spirit of the Covenant. 
It then went on to list these objectives: 
1. to ensure that a comprehensive review is undertaken with respect to national legislation,                     
administrative rules and procedures171 
                                                 
169 Craven, M., 113 and Mower Jnr., A., 42-43. 
170 The Committee was established in 1985, met for the first time in 1987 and has to date held 14 sessions. 
Meeting initially on an annual basis, the Committee currently convenes twice a year, holding two three-
week sessions, generally in May and November/December. It holds all its meetings at the United Nations 
Office at Geneva, Fact Sheet No.16 (Rev.1), The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/fs16.htm#6 accessed 19 April 2007  
171 General Comment No.1, para 2. 
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2. to ensure that the State party monitors the actual situation with respect to each of the rights on a 
regular basis and is thus aware of the extent to which the various rights are, or are not, being 
enjoyed by all individuals within its territory or under its jurisdiction172 
3. to enable the Government to demonstrate that such principled policy-making has in fact been 
undertaken.”173  
4. to facilitate public scrutiny of government policies with respect to economic, social and cultural 
rights and to encourage the involvement of the various economic, social and cultural sectors of 
society in the formulation, implementation and review of the relevant policies174  
5. to provide a basis on which the State party itself, as well as the Committee, can effectively 
evaluate the extent to which progress has been made towards the realization of the obligations 
contained in the Covenant.175 
6. to enable the State party itself to develop a better understanding of the problems and shortcomings 
encountered in efforts to realize progressively the full range of economic, social and cultural 
rights.176 
7. to enable the Committee, and the States parties as a whole, to facilitate the exchange of 
information among States and to develop a better understanding of the common problems faced by 
States and a fuller appreciation of the type of measures which might be taken to promote effective 
realization of each of the rights contained in the Covenant.177 
 
In 1991, the CESCR thence produced a revised and an even more extensive set of 
guidelines178 which asked specific questions that States could use as guidelines in 
assessing their progress towards the realization of articles one and two as well as six to15 
of the Covenant. This forward looking, comprehensive, methodical approach was a giant 
leap forward the Covenant, Committee and State parties as States now not only had a set 
of ideological goals and conceptual objectives but specific questions that could aid in 
their compilation and construction of the report and, the committee likewise had specific 
questions and guidelines which better aided their review of the reports and assessing 
overall States’ achievements and compliance with the Covenant. This ultimately enabled 
States and the committee to better engage with the reporting process. More importantly, 
theses questions and guidelines also have the potential to serve as or aid in the 
                                                 
172 Ibid, para 3. 
173 Ibid, para 4. 
174 Ibid, para 5. 
175 Ibid, para 6. 
176 Ibid, para 7. 
177 Ibid, para 8. 
178 Revised general Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of Reports to be Submitted by States 
Parties under articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 17 
June 1991, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/E.C.12.1991.1.En?Opendocument 
Accessed 28 March 2007. 
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conceptualization and concretization of targets, goals and or criteria for States as they 
create their national benchmarks. General Comment No. 14 supports this assertion. It 
states: 
“During the periodic reporting procedure the Committee will engage in a process of scoping with 
the State party. Scoping involves the joint consideration by the State part and the Committee of the 
indicators and national benchmarks which will then provide the targets to be achieved during the 
next reporting period. In the following five years, the State party will use these national 
benchmarks to help monitor its implementation of article 12 [of the Covenant].”  179  
 
On being submitted, reports and other information from the State are used to 
structure a dialogue between the State and CESCR. The committee will furnish a set of 
questions to the State which it will answer orally and, on completing this, the committee 
will conclude by issuing a set of concluding observations which are issued to the State in 
private and thence made public on the last day of the session. The committee’s 
observations are divided into five sections: (1) the introduction; (2) positive aspects; (3) 
factors and difficulties impeding the implementation of the Covenant; (4) principal 
subjects of concern; (5) suggestions and recommendations.180 Other recognized 
definitions of “benchmark” include this consultative process as a crucial stage of 
benchmark creation and development. Dianne Otto states that a benchmark is “…a target, 
set by the State party after appropriate consultation [here with the CESCR], in relation to 
each of the Covenant rights.”181 This five step consultative process is thus potentially 
very useful to States as they create, develop and set their national benchmarks. The 
Committee not only acknowledges and comments on positive aspects of States’ work 
towards the realization of ESCRs, but also engages the State in a dialogue on difficulties 
                                                 
179 General Comment No. 14, para 58. 
180 Fact Sheet No.16 (Rev.1), The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/fs16.htm#6. 
181 Otto, D., “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”, (2002), 3, Human Rights Law Resources, 6. 
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faced in their implementation and other subjects of concern. Through their 
recommendations and suggestions the committee gives States feedback and further 
guidelines which may be used as they not only implement policies for the realization of 
ESCRs but also as benchmarks which they (and the committee) can use to gauge their 
compliance with their obligations under the treaty. The concluding observations 
procedure thus has the potential to be powerful as it engages the Committee and the State 
in a constructive, consultative manner, and is one in which expertise and innovative ideas 
and or solutions to problems can be exchanged. It however, has suffered from some 
systemic issues which are further magnified in the African context.  
Michael O’Flaherty182 maintains that some of the issues affecting the efficacy of 
the concluding observations procedure across the UN’s varied treaties are: problems of 
accuracy and functionality, conflict between committees’ precise recommendations and 
States’ legitimate discretion, and follow up with States. O’Flaherty explains further that 
barriers to the submission, access to information, and the lack of independent, expert 
human resources to sift and analyze information are major impediments to effective 
dialogue between the State and the committee. This consequently tarnishes the overall 
quality of the concluding observations process.183 He also argues that treaty bodies, in 
giving recommendations may often do so on matters that do not relate directly to the 
treaty. Things such as reservations and ratification of other related instruments as well as 
precise methodology for implementation are ultimately the choice of the State. 
O’Flaherty reasons that because the mandate of treaty bodies and the interdependence of 
all human rights, it often becomes necessary for them to make recommendations that 
                                                 
182 O’Flaherty, M. “The Concluding Observations of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies”, (2006), 
Vol. 6(1), Human Rights Law Review, 27-52. 
183 Ibid, pg 37. 
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compete with such rights.184 Lastly, O’Flaherty argues that follow up by committees is 
another shortfall within the concluding observations procedure. He claims that follow up 
by treaty committees is of central importance to the effectiveness of their work as without 
follow up, the likelihood of implementation is slim to none. He lists many actors that 
have been involved in the follow up process but those specific to the ICESCR have 
mostly been NGOs.185 While O’Flaherty is optimistic about the changes to the 
observations features and hopeful about the challenges now facing it, it is maintained that 
such challenges are magnified in the African context because it requires significant 
amounts of political will to engage and remain engaged with the CESCR and the 
reporting process.  
African States, particular post (civil) war and or in transition societies, stand to 
gain significantly from a process that engages them meaningfully with the review of their 
legislative, administrative and social policies. It is, however, maintained that the 
aforementioned general issues of a critically backlogged system and the relating issue of 
the resource constraints of the CESCR, the incompletion of the reporting process and thus 
the underutilization of the concluding observation process are exacerbated within the 
African context as it takes significant political will to engage and remain engaged with 
the process.  African States rarely fully comply with their obligation to submit reports to 
the CESCR and consequently, more often than not, do not benefit from the reflective, 
consultative dialogue with the CESCR. This process is of particular significance in the 
creation national benchmarks of implementation and measurement of their compliance 
with the standards and provisions of the Covenant. The effectiveness of the reporting 
                                                 
184 Ibid, pg 42. 
185 Ibid, 51. 
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procedure as a facilitator of the benchmarking process is therefore severely impacted by 
African States’ non-compliance and consequent non-engagement with it. 
 
3.3.2 African State Reporting 
Of the 47 African states that have acceded and or ratified the ICESCR only 20186 
have ever submitted a report to the Covenant’s monitoring body. This means that a 
majority 58 per cent of the African States party to the Covenant have never formally 
fulfilled the obligations set forth in articles 16 and 17. States falling into this category 
include Angola, Ethiopia, Namibia, Ghana, Somalia, Swaziland, Chad, Uganda 
Seychelles and Mauritania. Of the States that did submit at least one report are 
Zimbabwe, Sudan, Rwanda, Algeria, Egypt and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
Again, very little emphasis should be placed on which or the types of that States did or 
did not manage to submit a report as they again span a wide variety of political and 
economic regimes. The non-submission of reports can therefore be said to not be 
common or specific to or only affecting one type of African political regime or States 
with certain levels of economic development.187  
The number of overdue reports gives a more complete picture of States’ 
compliance with the obligation to submit reports as report due dates are based on when a 
State becomes party to the treaty. For example, Rwanda is recorded in table two as 
having submitted four reports but table three188 indicates that it actually owes the CESCR 
                                                 
186 See Table 2. Table produced from data obtained from United Nations Treaty Body Database, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf, last accessed 19 April 2007 
187 This is to be discussed further in chapter four using Tables 7 through 9. 
188 Table produced from data obtained from United Nations Treaty Body Database, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf, last accessed 19 April 2007. 
O-On time, L-Late, E-Early, *-Timeliness of submission unclear. 
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four reports. Looking at table two alone would incorrectly indicate the 58 per cent that 
did submit reports to the CESCR did so completely and on time. Table three, which gives 
data on the number of overdue reports thus places the data in table two into a bit better 
perspective. It makes very evident that though many States are recorded as having 
submitted a report they are still overdue by just as many if not more. This is due primarily 
to the fact that many States begin the reporting process but do not complete it. Moreover, 
tables one, two, and three overwhelmingly indicate that the vast majority of African 
States are yet to fully or even partially fulfil the obligation to submit a report within two 
years of signature to the Covenant. They further indicate that even if they have submitted 
a report 99 percent of them do so late. To be duly noted also is that only eight and a half 
per cent of States are on track with their schedule for the submission of their reports.189 
Of these better complying States are: Zambia, Morocco, Benin, and Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya which have no overdue reports and have kept on track with their report 
submission schedules.  
It is contended that this issue of non-submission and the incompletion of the State 
reporting process by African States is an indication of the significance of the effect of 
political will on an already problematic benchmarking system. By not submitting reports 
and or not completing the reporting process, African States are not able to dialogue with 
the committee and engage with its recommendations through the concluding observations 
procedure. They therefore lose out on a very essential aspect of the benchmarking feature 
of the State reporting system as they not only are unable to reflect on their progress with 
the realization of ESCRs but also, are not able to, as they attempt to implement and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
189 Only four of the 47 signatories are on track with their submission schedules those are: Zambia, 
Morocco, Benin, and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 
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realize them, set benchmarks which they (and the CESCR) can use to measure their 
progress and compliance with the terms of the treaty. It is therefore maintained that while 
there have been changes to the system to allow for research and investigation into a 
particular situation by the committee as well as shadow reports, this is still more the 
exception than the rule and, more importantly, do not involve the State itself. The 
committee is more often than not overworked, backlogged and pressed for time. And, 
though these are not problems that affect or are specific to only African States, it is 
exacerbated by the fact that it thus requires significant political will on the part of States 
fully engage with the CESCR and the national benchmarking process that the State 
reporting system is to facilitate.  
Producing State reports is costly190. Most African States have ratified at least one 
other UN Treaty dealing with human rights191 and are therefore obliged to produce 
reports for those treaties as well. The process for submission can therefore become a 
cumbersome, highly time consuming and resource intensive process and therefore 
requires a significant commitment on the part of the State to expend the fiscal, human and 
technical resources required to fully engage with the process. With the depth of 
questioning set forth in the new guidelines for state reporting192 many States will require 
experts to aid in research, data capturing and analysis, and the overall assembly of the 
report, which requires a significant amount of political will to fund, facilitate and 
undertake.  
                                                 
190 The production of the report entails the enlistment of human, technical, and financial resources. 
191 UN Treaty Body Database, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf. 
192 Revised general Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of Reports to be Submitted by States 
Parties under articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 17 
June 1991, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/E.C.12.1991.1.En?Opendocument 
59 
States, such as Liberia, which are emerging out of long civil wars and could use 
the reporting system as a means of attacking and addressing its overwhelming social and 
economic issues, have not been able to date to produce a state report because of the vast 
challenges that plague post civil war societies. For such societies, regaining stability 
through the opening of schools, hospitals and the re-establishment of electricity and water 
supplies are tantamount on their agendas. Though these priorities coincide with the object 
and purpose of the Covenant, they still require significant demonstration and application 
of political commitment towards domesticating international benchmarks set by the 
Covenant and the CESCR as well as the creation of national benchmarks by engaging and  
completing the State reporting procedure.  
 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
Chapter three has looked at the general role of and issues associated with State 
reporting as a benchmarking process. This served to assess the general effectiveness of 
the State reporting system and set the stage for the discussion on State reporting and 
national benchmarking within the African context. It then looked briefly at the role of 
adoption and ratification of the Covenant within the African context to establish the 
economic, social and political relevance and role of the ICESCR in Africa. African 
States’ compliance with the State reporting procedure and, consequently, the level of 
their engagement with the CESCR in the establishment of their national benchmarks was 
then assessed and discussed. It was concluded that the State reporting process requires 
significant political will to engage and remain engaged with. Additionally, African States 
are not reporting and hence are not engaging with the CESCR. It is therefore inferred that 
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national benchmarking (State reporting) which ought to function as a tool towards the 
implementation and realization of ESCRS, is not occurring in the vast majority of States 
across Africa due to a lack of political will.  
To conclude, the study proves this by looking at comparable English speaking 
Caribbean States’ with similar levels of economic development, their compliance with 
the obligation under the Covenant to submit periodic reports, and their HDI rankings. The 
objective of the comparability between African and Commonwealth Caribbean States is 
to test the reasonableness of the assertion of chapters two and three that current 
benchmarks and benchmarking processes towards the realization of ESCRs are 















CHAPTER 4: COMPARISON BETWEEN AFRICAN AND 
CARIBBEAN COMMONWEALTH STATES: ECONOMIC 
RESOURCE AVAILABILITY, STATE REPORTING COMPLIANCE 
AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
African leaders have been widely cited as notoriously disregarding of the 
importance of the protection and enforcement of human rights and consequently the 
primary agents behind the gross non-realization of ESCRs in Africa.193 Development data 
from the UNDP and World Bank consistently rank African States among the lowest in 
terms of their levels of human development.194 Many African leaders, however, maintain 
that their primary constraint in this regard is the severe lack of resources.195 In as much as 
this is recognized by the Committee, its General Comments consistently reiterate that 
obligations under the Covenant exist independently of the availability of resources and 
that ESCRs can be realized in a variety of political contexts.196 As has been maintained in 
chapter two, benchmarks set by earlier General Comments and the Limburg Principles do 
not aptly tease out the critical dynamic between the obligation to fully realize the terms of 
the Covenant and the crisis of available resources. Later General Comments, in 
                                                 
193 See Human Rights Watch, 2001 World Report: Africa At 
Http://Www.Hrw.Org/Wr2k1/Africa/Index.Html And Amnesty International Report (2007): African Union 
Summit In Accra: Time For African Leaders To Make Human Rights Count And Implement Their 
Promises And Commitments at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior630032007. 
194 see undp’s indicators by tables: monitoring human development: enlarging people’s choices at 
http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/indicators/indicators_table.cfm for water, sanitation, nutrition status, 
life expectancy and human poverty indices for africa. 
195 Odinakulu, C.A., “Analysis of Paralysis or Paralysis by Analysis: Implementing Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights Under the African Charter of People’s and Human Rights”, (2001), vol. 23, HumanRrights 
Quarterly, 327-369; Leopold Senghor, the founder of Senegal Comment that “human rights begin with 
breakfast” “became the slogan of some developing country governments, who argued that a new international 
economic order was a prerequisite for the adequate realisation of human rights.” From: Plant, R. “Human 
rights, decent work and the role of labour  standards in international development policies a concept paper on 
rights-based thinking, as applied to the ilo's  standard-setting activities” at: 
http://training.itcilo.it/decentwork/staffconf2002/presentations/planthrlabour02.doc 
196 see general comment no. 3, para 1 and general comment no. 4, para 10.  
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addressing this issue, direct State parties to courses of action which are significantly 
dependent on political will. This conceptual and practical dilemma thus raises the 
question of the relative role of resources versus State political will in the realization of 
ESCRs. It was concluded in both chapters three and two that political will played a far 
greater role in Africa than did the constraint of resources. In order to prove this, this 
chapter will compare levels of compliance with the State reporting procedure and levels 
of human development (as is indicated by the HDI) between African and Commonwealth 
Caribbean States of similar levels of available economic resources.  
 
4.2 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AS AN INDICATOR OF THE REALIZATION OF 
ESCRS 
 
A 2006 UNDP Human Development report used its Human Development Index 
(HDI) to rank signatories of the ICESCR.197 Of particular importance is that a number of 
factors considered by and accounted for in the HDI are reflective of many of the rights, 
objectives and standards espoused in the ICESCR. This index is thus taken here to be a 
robust assessment of the state of human development of signatories to the Covenant and 
hence an adequate measurement of their realization of ESCRs. Among the top twenty 
ranked States are Norway at number one, Spain at 19, Switzerland at ten, Australia at 
four, Canada at eight and Japan at nine.198 The last twenty-five States on the list, 
                                                 
197 “The HDI – human development index – is a summary composite index that measures a country's 
average achievements in three basic aspects of human development: longevity, knowledge, and a decent 
standard of living. Longevity is measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge is measured by a 
combination of the adult literacy rate and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment 
ratio; and standard of living by GDP per capita (PPP US$).” Human Development Reports, 
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/indic_242_1_1.html.  
198 See Table 4. Table 4 from UNDP Indicators by Tables: Monitoring Human Development Enlarging 
People’s Choices at http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/statistics/indicators/indicators_table.cfm 
Source :UN (United Nations). 2006d. “Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary- General.” New 
York.[http://untreaty.un.org.]. Accessed August 2006. 
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however, are only African States. They include: Sierra Leone in last position at 175, 
Gambia at the top of the last 25 at 151 and Nigeria just below that at 152. Benin and 
Zambia (two of the few states complying with their reporting obligation) fall in at 159 
and 163 respectively and Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Morocco (which are also on 
schedule for the submission of their periodic reports to the committee) fall in at 61 and 
126 respectively. It is glaringly obvious from this table that the majority of African States 
currently lag behind in the realization of ESCRS and, moreover, that the real effects of 
the Covenant are yet to be felt by the majority of people on the continent.  
 
4.3 COMPARISON BETWEEN AFRICAN AND CARIBBEAN 
COMMONWEALTH STATES: ECONOMIC RESOURCE 
AVAILABILITY, STATE REPORTING COMPLIANCE AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.3.1 Comparison of Available Economic Resources  
The basic objective of the comparability between African and Commonwealth 
Caribbean States is to test the reasonableness of the assertion of chapters two and three 
that current benchmarks and benchmarking processes towards the realization of ESCRs 
are not as impacted by the level of resources available to the State but rather political 
will.  
Tables five199 and six200 present estimates of African and Commonwealth 
Caribbean States’ per capita GDPs respectively. It can be seen from these tables that the 
GDP levels of Caribbean States fall between the mid to top range of GDP levels for 
                                                                                                                                                 
The table includes states that have signed or ratified at least one of the six human rights instruments. 
Information is as of August 2006. 
 




African States. The Bahamas, the Commonwealth Caribbean State with the highest per 
capita GDP at 20,507.18 is just above Equatorial Guinea, the African State with the 
highest per capita GDP at 20,322.06. Guyana and Jamaica, the Commonwealth 
Caribbean States with the lowest per capita GDPs, fall just below Morocco which has a 
per capita GDPs of 4,955.67. This might raise the expectation that Caribbean countries 
would be more compliant with the State reporting procedure, have higher levels of human 
development and thus be farther ahead with the realization of ESCRs, simply because 
they have, on average, more available economic resources. It is, however, argued that 
there appears to be no strong relationship between available economic resources (as 
measured by GDP PPP) and States’ compliance with the State reporting procedure. 
Table seven201 presents per capita GDP Ranks for African States and the number 
of reports they have submitted to the CESCR. It has been previously established in 
chapter three of the study that the non-submission of reports is not common to any one 
type of African State as the States that are yet to submit reports to the Committee span a 
wide variety of political and economic regimes. Tables two and three indicated this by 
demonstrating that the vast majority of African States simply do not submit reports to the 
Committee and, if they do submit reports, an even more overwhelming number do so late 
and or do not complete the reporting process.  
On close analysis of the data presented in table seven, it therefore becomes 
apparent that there is also not a strong relationship levels of resource availability (as is 
indicated by per capita GDP rank) and levels of compliance with the obligation to submit 
                                                 
201 Source: United Nations Treaty Body Database, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf and CIA World 
Factbook GDP (PPP) World Rank Order at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html. 
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reports across Africa. Zambia, ranked 212th in the per capita GDP rankings202, has 
submitted two reports and is also not overdue.203 Likewise is Benin which has a world per 
capita GDP ranking of 209204. Of the States with higher per capita GDP world ranks are 
Equatorial Guinea, which has never submitted a report and is overdue by four, Mauritius 
which is ranked at 73, has submitted two reports but is overdue by three and Algeria, 
which is ranked at 110, also has submitted two reports but is also overdue by three. There 
is therefore no visible pattern to suggest that States with more available resources are 
more compliant with the obligation to submit periodic reports. Nor can it be suggested 
that the data indicates that “poorer” States are less compliant. The only State where it 
could be said that there is a link between level of available resources and compliance 
with the obligation to submit reports is Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which is the second 
highest African ranked country (after Equatorial Guinea) on the per capita GDP world 
ranking at 81205 and has submitted a total of three reports and is overdue by none.206 As 
this is the only of the 47 African States assessed where the two factors converge, it can be 
firmly stated that the data in table seven overwhelmingly suggests that there is no strong 
relationship between levels of available resources and compliance with the obligation to 




                                                 
202 Ibid. 
203 See tables two and three 
204 CIA World Factbook GDP (PPP) World Rank Order at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html 
205 Ibid. 
206 See tables two and three. 
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4.3.2 Comparison of State Reporting Compliance 
 
 Table eight207 tests the strength of this assertion even further by comparing 
Commonwealth Caribbean States’ periodic reports submitted and overdue and their per 
capita GDP levels with that of African States’.  
 It must first be said that of the eleven Commonwealth Caribbean States only 
seven are parties to the Covenant.208 There is clearly a higher proportion of Caribbean 
States that are not parties to the Covenant than those that are not in Africa.209 Though the 
Bahamas, St. Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and Barbuda, and St. Lucia are not parties to the 
Covenant they are included in order to present a more balanced and comprehensive view 
of the relationship between the availability of economic resources, compliance with the 
submission of periodic report and the level of human development in the Caribbean.  
 Of the seven Commonwealth Caribbean States that are parties to the Covenant 
only two have never submitted reports to the Committee. Of the eleven African States 
chosen, ten have ratified the Covenant210 and are thus under the obligation to submit 
periodic reports. Of this ten, only five have ever submitted reports to the Committee. That 
is, 28 per cent of Commonwealth Caribbean States have never complied with the 
obligation to submit a periodic report to the CESCR while there is staggering 50 per cent 
rate of non-compliance by counterpart African States The data thus clearly suggests that 
                                                 
207 Source: United Nations Treaty Body Database, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf and CIA World 
Factbook GDP (PPP) World Rank Order at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html. 
*Denotes non-signatory to the Covenant 
**Denotes Signatory to the Covenant; States that are not otherwise distinguished have ratified the 
Covenant. 
208 United Nations Treaty Body Database at: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf. 
209 Among those African States that have neither signed nor ratified the Covenant are: Botswana, the 
Comoros, Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Principe and South Africa has signed but not ratified the 
Covenant. United Nations Treaty Body Database at: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf. 
210 The eleventh State, South Africa, has signed the Covenant. 
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Caribbean States are generally more compliant with this obligation. It can be accordingly 
extrapolated that there is therefore a larger proportion of Caribbean States are engaged 
with the reporting process and the Committee and therefore national benchmarking 
processes. Though Caribbean States are generally more engaged with State reporting, it 
can also be seen from the table that compliance between the regions can be said to not 
necessarily be affected be the availability of economic resources. More important to this 
investigation however, is that levels of compliance run across the spectrum of States 
within their respective region. Thus, while Jamaica, having the lowest per capita GDP has 
only submitted two reports and is overdue by one, Trinidad at the higher end of the per 
capita GDP spectrum, has likewise only submitted two reports and is also overdue by 
one. This is also evident across the selected African countries. Angola, which is at the 
bottom end of the per capita GDP spectrum, has never submitted a report and is overdue 
by three, is no more compliant with the obligation to submit periodic reports than 
Equatorial Guinea which, at the very top of the GDP spectrum, has also never submitted 
a report and also owes three. It would therefore appear from the data that levels of 
compliance with the obligation to submit periodic reports are not significantly impacted 













4.3.3 Comparison of Available Economic Resources and Levels of Human 
Development 
 
The data in table nine211 indicates that Caribbean States in general rank higher in 
the human development index than African States of comparable economic resources. 
Whereas Caribbean States range from 52 to 92 on the HDI, comparable African States 
range from as low as 47 to as high as 160. More importantly is that there are only two 
African States that are ranked below 100, Seychelles at 47 and Mauritius at 62 while all 
Commonwealth Caribbean States are ranked below 100. This not only indicates the, on 
average, lower levels of human development in Africa but that there is also a much wider 
range in levels of human development between the States. The most striking feature of 
the data is that though Caribbean States rank equally low on the per capita GDP ranking 
index, their ranking is generally much higher than comparable African States on the HDI. 
For example, St. Vincent and the Grenadines’ per capita GDP rank is 155 while its HDI 
rank is 88 in comparison, Angola ranks 142 in terms of GDP and 161 on the HDI. Also is 
Grenada whose GDP rank is 147 but has an HDI rank of 85 while Morocco has a GDP 
rank of 140 but an HDI rank of 123. 
 There is thus not only a marked difference in level of human development 
between the two regions but also a significant difference between States, with similar 




                                                 
211 Source: CIA World Factbook GDP (PPP) World Rank Order at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html and International 






The above discussed data212 indicates that Caribbean States are more engaged 
with the Committee. As a greater proportion of them are reporting, they are consequently 
in a position to be assisted by the Committee in the development of their internal 
benchmarks and, through this, more able to achieve the realization of ESCRs. Their 
relatively higher ranking on the HDI might be indicative of the result of this process. On 
the other hand, African States demonstrate chronic levels of non-compliance with similar 
levels of economic resources. The implication of this is that they are less engaged with 
the Committee and as such demonstrate lower levels of the realization of ESCRs which is 
reflected in their generally lower rankings on the HDI. These findings thus speak to the 
aforementioned appeals of African leaders to the paucity of resources as the main 
constraint to the realization of ESCRs. Caribbean States appear to have much higher 
levels of the realization of ESCRs with comparable levels of economic resources. This, 
therefore would seem to indicate that the true constraint to the realization of ESCRs in 
Africa lies elsewhere. Furthermore, while fewer Caribbean States have signed or ratified 
the Covenant the data demonstrates that they have higher levels of the realization of 
ESCRs as is reflected in their relatively high HDI rankings. Ratification or signature to 
the Covenant therefore cannot be said to indicate the actual level of States’ political will 
to fully realize ESCRs.  
What these findings firmly underscores is the importance of the domestication of 
ESCRs through benchmarking processes which, as has been demonstrated, are not as 
limited by the availability of resources. This chapter has demonstrated that 
                                                 
212 See Table 8. 
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Commonwealth Caribbean States with similar levels of economic resources are 
performing better at reporting and therefore engage more with the CESCR in creating 
national benchmarks than African States have been. It therefore appears from this that 
African States have great difficulty engaging with benchmarking processes, as are 
established by the Covenant and its expounding documents. As has been shown, these 
processes go beyond the issue of resource constraints and may therefore be more an issue 
of political will. It is therefore concluded that the effectiveness of current benchmarks 
and benchmarking processes which measure positive State obligations towards the 





CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION: FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE REALIZATION OF ESCRs IN AFRICA 
  
It has been shown that there is an overwhelming majority of African States that 
are party to the ICESCR. Despite this, conditions of humanity continue to plummet and 
persistently singe the hope and promise of the improvement of quality of life that the 
Covenant embodies. The question arises as to what reasons underlie the consistent under-
realizations of ESCRs in Africa. It has often been maintained that the realization of 
ESCRs is highly resource intensive and therefore resource stricken or developing nations 
(such as those in Africa) may not be in a position to undertake their full realization. Many 
in the international community have, however, cited a lack of commitment as reason for 
the gross under-realization of ESCRs in Africa. The study therefore aimed to explore this 
question by examining the relative importance of resources and political will in States’ 
engagement with the benchmarks and benchmarking processes established by the 
ICESCR and the CESCR.  
 It was first maintained that it is not the nature of ESCRs per se but rather that the 
vague, broad and imprecise manner in which the Covenant and some of its earlier 
expounding documents which establish the terms and provisions of the benchmarks 
require significant levels of political will to fully engage with them. This is a significant 
factor affecting the benchmarks and ultimately the realization of ESCRs. It is, however, 
conceded that as the first documents pronouncing on these rights and their ensuing 
obligations, many of the preoccupations and debates of the drafting process survived 
through to the Covenant’s completion. Their primary strength therefore, is that they 
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establish the rights and begin the grounding process for their interpretation, 
implementation and hence realization.  
Chapters two and three set the groundwork for the assertion that benchmarks and 
benchmarking processes, and ultimately the realization of ESCRs in Africa, is 
significantly impacted by political will and less so by severe constraints in resources. It 
was shown that both the benchmarks set by the Covenant and its expounding documents 
and the benchmarking process of State reporting require significant levels of political will 
for States to engage and remain engaged with them.  
Despite that the later General Comments of the CESCR, add substantial details 
and depth to the rights themselves as well as the standards for measuring States’ 
obligations towards their realization they suggest that States look to external guidelines as 
sources of right specific benchmarks and recommend that States engage with bodies such 
as the IMF and World Bank for assistance with the preparation of plans of action and 
their subsequent implementation. It not only requires significant political will to engage 
with and thence domesticate international plans of action (for example on health and 
housing) but also to do so with bodies such as the IMF with which many developing 
countries have had traumatic and or problematic relationships. Thus, not only are these 
benchmarks vague and imprecise and therefore require significant political will on the 
part of State parties to interpret and domesticate, they also, because they point States to 
other guidelines and international bodies as sources of or as benchmarks themselves, 
require further political will to engage on such a level.  
It was argued that the issues that are inherent to the State reporting process are 
further exacerbated in the African context by a lack of political will. It was shown that 
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the majority of African States do not submit reports and, if they do, an even larger 
number do so late or do not completing the reporting process at all. The implication of 
this is that the majority of African States do not engage with the CESCR to develop 
national benchmarks towards the implementation and realization of ESCRs. It was thus 
concluded that national benchmarking through State reporting, within the African 
context, is significantly impacted by the fact that it requires significant political will on 
the part of State parties to submit reports and consistently engage with the CESCR.  
These assertions were supported by looking at comparable English speaking 
Caribbean States’ with similar levels of economic development, their compliance with 
the obligation under the Covenant to submit periodic reports, and their HDI rankings. It is 
shown that, the issue of the non-realization of ESCRs in Africa is thus not specific to any 
one type of economic or political regime. It is ubiquitous in Africa. More importantly, it 
is shown that economic resources do not play a significant role in the level of human 
development and compliance with State reporting in both African and Commonwealth 
Caribbean States. From this is concluded that political will plays a more significant role 
in the level of African States’ engagement with benchmarking processes and ultimately 
the realization of ESCRs. The implication of this is that the under-realization of ESCRs 
in Africa is more the result of a lack of political will to enforce, implement and protect 
them. It follows therefore that to improve the levels of realization of ESCRs in Africa, the 
issue of political will must be addressed. Political motivation is, however, difficult to 
engender particularly by bodies such as the CESCR which do not have adjudicatory 
powers. In order to improve the level of the realization of ESCRs in Africa it is therefore 
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necessary address the benchmarks and benchmarking process particularly where they 
create the need for significant levels of political motivation on the part of State parties.  
To that end, it is suggested that where the committee continues to expound the 
nature and scope of ESCRs and the obligations under the Covenant towards their 
realization through the production of General Comments, it should provide specific, 
measurable, universally recognizable standards that are framed in positive terms. Where 
the Committee points to international sources as guidelines and benchmarks which have 
been established, it should do more than merely refer to the documents as exemplars. It 
should ensure that the Comments include (substantively) the issues (raised by these 
external documents) it believes to be most critical to the interpretation and 
implementation of the benchmarks and, ultimately the realization of ESCRs. 
Where State reporting is concerned, the Committee should consider allowing 
State input in, review of and or contributions to shadow reports from NGOs. It should 
also consider oral reports, particularly for the follow up and concluding observations 
procedures. This would potentially, where States do not submit reports or complete the 
reporting process, include them and keep them engaged with the reporting and thereby 
national benchmarking process. This would also aid in the issues of resource constraints 
and backlog that the committee faces as there would be a significantly lower volume of 
paper work to sift and would also be less time consuming.  
As has been shown the issue of available resources available is less significant a 
factor in the realization of ESCRs. With adjustments to benchmarking processes such that 
they are not as reliant on political will, the realization of ESCRs in Africa may prove to 




 State Parties to ICESCR Entry Into 
Force 
Rec. of Instr.        Sign. Date 
1.  Algeria* 12/12/89 12/09/89  
2.  Angola 10/04/92 10/01/92  
3.  Benin 12/06/92 12/03/92  
4.  Burkina Faso 04/04/99 04/01/99  
5.  Burundi* 09/08/90 09/05/90  
6.  Cameroon* 27/09/84 27/06/84  
7.  Cape Verde 06/11/93 06/08/93  
8.  Central African Republic* 08/08/81 08/05/81  
9.  Chad 09/09/95 09/06/95  
10.  Congo* 05/01/84 05/10/83  
11.  Côte d'Ivoire 26/06/92 26/03/92  
12.  Democratic Republic of the Congo* 01/02/77 01/11/76  
13.  Djibouti 05/02/2003 05/11/2002  
14.  Egypt* 14/04/82 14/01/82 04/08/67 
15.  Equatorial Guinea* 25/12/87 25/09/87  
16.  Eritrea 17/07/2001 17/04/2001  
17.  Ethiopia 11/09/93 11/06/93  
18.  Gabon* 21/04/83 21/01/83  
19.  Gambia* 29/03/79 29/12/78  
20.  Ghana 07/12/2000 07/09/2000 07/09/2000 
21.  Guinea* 24/04/78 24/01/78 28/02/67 
22.  Guinea-Bissau 02/10/92 02/07/92  
23.  Kenya* 03/01/76 01/05/72  
24.  Lesotho 09/12/92 09/09/92  
25.  Liberia 22/12/2004 22/09/2004 18/04/67 
26.  Libyan Arab Jamahiriya* 03/01/76 15/05/70  
27.  Madagascar* 03/01/76 22/09/71 14/04/70 
28.  Malawi 22/03/94 22/12/93  
29.  Mali* 03/01/76 16/07/74  
30.  Mauritania 17/02/2005 17/11/2004  
31.  Mauritius* 03/01/76 12/12/73  
32.  Morocco* 03/08/79 03/05/79 19/01/77 
33.  Namibia 28/02/95 28/11/94  
34.  Niger* 07/06/86 07/03/86  
35.  Nigeria 29/10/93 29/07/93  
36.  Rwanda* 03/01/76 16/04/75  
37.  Senegal* 13/05/78 13/02/78 06/07/70 
38.  Seychelles 05/08/92 05/05/92  
39.  Sierra Leone 23/11/96 23/08/96  
40.  Somalia* 24/04/90 24/01/90  
Table 1 










































                                
41.  Sudan* 18/06/86 18/03/86  
42.  Swaziland 26/06/2004 26/03/2004 26/03/2004 
43.  Togo* 24/08/84 24/05/84  
44.  Uganda* 21/04/87 21/01/87  
45.  United Republic of Tanzania* 11/09/76 11/06/76  
46.  Zambia* 10/07/84 10/04/84  
47.  Zimbabwe* 13/08/91   
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State Party to ICESCR Reports 
Submitted 
Date(s) of Submission 
Algeria 2 27/09/1994 (L); 24/05/2000 (L) 
Angola 0  
Benin 2 05/02/2001(L); 19/12/2006(E) 
Burkina Faso 0  
Burundi 0  
Cameroon 2 14/41987(L); 2705/1997(L) 
Cape Verde 0  
Central African Republic 0  
Chad 0  
Congo 0  
Côte d'Ivoire 0  
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
2 3/2/1987(L); 18/6/1984 (L) 
Djibouti 0  
Egypt 1 20/11/1997(L) 
Equatorial Guinea 0  
Eritrea 0  
Ethiopia 0  
Gabon 0  
Gambia 1 18/05/1994* 
Ghana 0  
Guinea 1 10/05/1996 (L) 
Guinea-Bissau 0  
Kenya 2 2/08/1993 (L); 07/07/2006(L) 
Lesotho 0  
Liberia 0  
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 3 23/09/1981*; 15/06/1991(L); 
04/04/2004(L) 
Madagascar 3 12/11/1980*; 31/05/1985*; 12/07/1984* 
Malawi 0  
Mali 1 30/11/1994* 
Mauritania 0  




Namibia 0  
Niger 0  
Nigeria 1 07/02/1996(L) 
Rwanda 4 03/10/1983*; 27/09/1985*; 
07/09/1987*; 09/07/11/1987* 
Senegal 4 15/04/1981*; 
28/04/1982*;14/10/1992*;28/09/1999(L) 
Seychelles 0  
Sierra Leone 0  
Somalia 0  
Sudan 1 08/05/1998(L) 
Swaziland 0  
Togo 1 04/05/2001* 
Uganda 0  
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
1 10/09/1979* 
Zambia 2 2/10/1985*; 29/07/2003(L) 
Zimbabwe 1 30/6/1995 
Table 2 










Burkina Faso 2 
Burundi 3 
Cameroon 2 
Cape Verde 3 
Central African Republic 4 
Chad 2 
Congo 4 
Côte d'Ivoire 3 










































Overdue Reports to the CESCR by African States  
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HDI Rank   Country   Signature/Ratification of ICESCR    

1 Norway   
2 Iceland   
3 Australia   
4 Ireland   
5 Sweden   
6 Canada   
7 Japan   
8 United States   
9 Switzerland   
10 Netherlands   
11 Finland   
12 Luxembourg   
13 Belgium   
14 Austria   
15 Denmark   
16 France   
17 Italy   
18 United Kingdom   
19 Spain   
20 New Zealand   
21 Germany   
22 Hong Kong, China (SAR) ..   
23 Israel   
24 Greece   
25 Singapore ..   
26 Korea, Rep. of   
27 Slovenia   
28 Portugal   
29 Cyprus   
30 Czech Republic   
31 Barbados   
32 Malta   
33 Kuwait   
34 Brunei Darussalam ..   
35 Hungary   
36 Argentina   
37 Poland   
38 Chile   
39 Bahrain ..   
40 Estonia   
41 Lithuania   
42 Slovakia   
43 Uruguay   
 
Table 41 
HDI Rankings of State Parties to the ICESCR 
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HDI Rank   Country   Signature/Ratification of ICESCR    

44 Croatia   
45 Latvia   
46 Qatar ..   
47 Seychelles   
48 Costa Rica   
49 United Arab Emirates ..   
50 Cuba ..   
51 Saint Kitts and Nevis ..   
52 Bahamas ..   
53 Mexico   
54 Bulgaria   
55 Tonga ..   
56 Oman ..   
57 Trinidad and Tobago   
58 Panama   
59 Antigua and Barbuda ..   
60 Romania   
61 Malaysia ..   
62 Bosnia and Herzegovina   
63 Mauritius   
64 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya   
65 Russian Federation   
66 Macedonia, TFYR   
67 Belarus   
68 Dominica   
69 Brazil   
70 Colombia   
71 Saint Lucia ..   
72 Venezuela, RB   
73 Albania   
74 Thailand   
75 Samoa (Western) ..   
76 Saudi Arabia ..   
77 Ukraine   
78 Lebanon   
79 Kazakhstan   
80 Armenia   
81 China   
82 Peru   
83 Ecuador   
84 Philippines   
85 Grenada   
86 Jordan   
87 Tunisia   
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HDI Rank   Country   Signature/Ratification of ICESCR    

88 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines   
89 Suriname   
90 Fiji ..   
91 Paraguay   
92 Turkey   
93 Sri Lanka   
94 Dominican Republic   
95 Belize   
96 Iran, Islamic Rep. of   
97 Georgia   
98 Maldives ..   
99 Azerbaijan   
100 Occupied Palestinian Territories ..   
101 El Salvador   
102 Algeria   
103 Guyana   
104 Jamaica   
105 Turkmenistan   
106 Cape Verde   
107 Syrian Arab Republic   
108 Indonesia   
109 Viet Nam   
110 Kyrgyzstan   
111 Egypt   
112 Nicaragua   
113 Uzbekistan   
114 Moldova, Rep. of   
115 Bolivia   
116 Mongolia   
117 Honduras   
118 Guatemala   
119 Vanuatu ..   
120 Equatorial Guinea   
121 South Africa   
122 Tajikistan   
123 Morocco   
124 Gabon   
125 Namibia   
126 India   
127 São Tomé and Principe   
128 Solomon Islands   
129 Cambodia   
130 Myanmar ..   
131 Botswana ..   
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
132 Comoros ..   
133 Lao People's Dem. Rep.   
134 Pakistan   
135 Bhutan ..   
136 Ghana   
137 Bangladesh   
138 Nepal   
139 Papua New Guinea ..   
140 Congo   
141 Sudan   
142 Timor-Leste   
143 Madagascar   
144 Cameroon   
145 Uganda   
146 Swaziland   
147 Togo   
148 Djibouti   
149 Lesotho   
150 Yemen   
151 Zimbabwe   
152 Kenya   
153 Mauritania   
154 Haiti ..   
155 Gambia   
156 Senegal   
157 Eritrea   
158 Rwanda   
159 Nigeria   
160 Guinea   
161 Angola   
162 Tanzania, U. Rep. of   
163 Benin   
164 Côte d'Ivoire   
165 Zambia   
166 Malawi   
167 Congo, Dem. Rep. of the   
168 Mozambique ..   
169 Burundi   
170 Ethiopia   
171 Chad   
172 Central African Republic   
173 Guinea-Bissau   
174 Burkina Faso   
175 Mali   
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176 Sierra Leone   






























GDP- PPP (USD) 
2006 
Equatorial Guinea 20,322.06 
Seychelles  17,915.19 
Botswana 16,190.21 
Mauritius 13,239.93 




















São Tomé and Príncipe 1,669.47 





Congo, Republic of 1,457.17 

























Sierra Leone 887.854 









The Bahamas 20,507.18 
Barbados 18,856.55 
Trinidad and Tobago 17,451.22 
St. Kitts and Nevis 17,523.28 
Antigua and Barbuda 13,908.64 
Grenada 9,255.21 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 8,090.87 





Commonwealth Caribbean States 














Algeria 2 3 110 
Angola 0 3 142 
Benin 2 0 209 
Burkina Faso 0 2 204 
Burundi 0 3 225 
Cameroon 2 2 172 
Cape Verde 0 3 121 
Central African 
Republic 
0 4 206 
Chad 0 2 195 
Congo 0 4 202 
Côte d'Ivoire 0 3 192 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
2 4 225 
Djibouti 0 1 210 
Egypt 1 3 144 
Equatorial Guinea 0 4 4 
Eritrea 0 1 216 
Ethiopia 0 3 211 
Gabon 0 4 116 
Gambia 1 4 183 
Ghana 0 1 167 
Guinea 1 4 177 
Guinea-Bissau 0 3 219 
Kenya 2 2 207 
Lesotho 0 3 168 
Liberia 0 1 217 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 3 0 81 
Madagascar 3 4 218 
Malawi 0 3 229 
Mali 1 4 203 
Mauritania 0 Status 
unclear 
169 
Mauritius 2 3 73 
Morocco 3 0 140 
Namibia 0 2 111 
Niger 0 4 215 
Nigeria 1 2 198 
Rwanda 4 4 194 
Senegal 4 1 190 
Seychelles 0 3 107 
Sierra Leone 0 2 220 
Somalia 0 3 228 
Sudan 1 2 173 
Swaziland 0 1 128 
    
    
Table 7 
African State Reports Submitted, Overdue 
and their GDP PPP (USD) World Ranks 
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 United Republic of 
Tanzania 
1 4 222 
Togo 1 0 191 
Uganda 0 4 186 
Zambia 2 0 212 



























*The Bahamas 20,507.18 
N/A N/A Equatorial 
Guinea 
20,322.06 0 4 
Barbados 18,856.55 3 4 Seychelles 17,915.19 0 3 












N/A N/A *South 
Africa 12,795.81 
N/A N/A 
Grenada 9,255.21 0 3 Namibia 8,423.49 0 2 
St. Vincent and 




*St. Lucia 7,140.61 
N/A N/A Cape 
Verde 7,244.43 
0 3 
Dominica 6,764.30 0 3 Swaziland 5,244.09 0 1 
Guyana 4,851.29 1 2 Morocco 4,955.67 3 0 
Jamaica 4,482.19 2 1 Angola 3,399.47 0 3 
Table 8 
Commonwealth Caribbean and African States’ 























































































Guyana 135 92 Namibia 111 124 





Dominica 150 68 Swaziland 128 146 
Grenada 147 85 Morocco 140 123 
St. Vincent & 





Commonwealth Caribbean and African States’ Per Capita 
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